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The financial technology sector is a fast moving environment. There are many innovations in
the automation and efficiency spheres where human intervention is required less and processing
speed is rapidly increasing. In the payments space this is evident as payments are processed
faster each year with the vast majority of these transactions driven automatically. This has
opened up a platform for fraudsters to operate on.
The use of Machine Learning (ML) in fraud detection has grown in popularity. Two methods,
logistic regression (LR) and support vector machines (SVMs), are used to identify fraud and are
investigated in this thesis. LR is less complex as compared to SVMs, but SVMs have unique
situations where it will outperform any other ML model [31]. Either method is assessed based on
application conditions and measured based on a certain set of confusion matrix based metrics.
The two methods are applied to a data set from a bank which participates in the automated
payment environment.
It was evident that the sample proportions selected had a major impact on the model per-
formance especially with regards to sensitivity and specificity. This was an exercise of fraud
identification where sensitivity is the most important. This may not be the case for all data sets
and environments as the cost to investigate false positives may be higher than the actual cost
of fraud prevented.
Condition testing and post model application diagnostics were applied in this research. It was
evident principle component analysis (PCA) feature selection was inferior to stepwise feature
selection. The relatively poor performance of the PCA feature selection models is due to a loss
of information when variables are removed when choosing the components.
When considering the odds ratios for LR, there were several variables that were protective
factors and others that were risk factors. These factors either increased or decreased the odds
of a case being fraudulent. It was found that when a debit order (DO) was associated with
an older person it was more likely to be fraudulent than when the DO was associated with a
younger person. It was also found that if a DO had a value of R99 or R45 then the odds of the
case being fraudulent would increase several-fold.
LR models produced equivalent results to the more complex SVM models with a much better
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Opsomming
Die finansiële tegnologie sektor is ’n vinnig bewegende omgewing. Daar is baie innovasies op
die gebied van outomatisering en doeltreffendheid, waar menslike ingryping minder nodig is
en die spoed van verwerking vinnig toeneem. In die betalingsruimte blyk dit dat betalings
elke jaar vinniger verwerk word, met die oorgrote meerderheid van die betalingstransaksies
wat outomaties verwerk word. Dit het ’n platform vir bedrieërs geskep. Gevolglik neem die
gewildheid van die gebruik van masjienleer (ML) in die opsporing van bedrog steeds toe.
Twee metodes, logistieke regressie (LR) en ondersteuningsvektormasjiene (SVMs), word gebruik
om bedrog te identifiseer en word in hierdie tesis ondersoek. LR is minder kompleks in verge-
lyking met SVMs, maar SVMs het unieke situasies waar dit beter sal presteer as enige ander
ML-model. Elk van hierdie metodes word beoordeel op grond van toepassingsvoorwaardes en
die prestasie word gemeet aan die hand van ’n sekere stel maatstawwe wat op die verwarrings-
matriks gebaseer is. Die twee metodes word op ’n datastel van ’n bank wat aan die outomatiese
betalingsomgewing deelneem, toegepas.
Dit was duidelik dat die geselekteerde steekproefverhoudings ’n groot invloed op die model-
prestasie, sensitiwiteit en spesifisiteit gehad het. In hierdie studie is die identifikasie van bedrog
die oogmerk, en daarom is die meting van sensitiwiteit die belangrikste. Dit is miskien nie
die geval vir alle datastelle en omgewings nie, aangesien die koste om vals positiewe gevalle te
ondersoek, hoër kan wees as wat die werklike koste van die voorkoming van bedrog is.
Die toetsing van voorwaardes en ontleding van postmodel diagnostieke is in hierdie navorsing
toegepas. Dit was duidelik dat hoofkomponentanalise (PCA) ondergeskik presteer het in verge-
lyking met stapsgewyse seleksiemetodes. Die relatief swak prestasie van die PCA seleksiemodelle
is te wyte aan die verlies van inligting wanneer veranderlikes ge-elimineer word in die keuse van
die komponente.
By die oorweging van die kansverhoudings vir LR was daar verskillende veranderlikes wat besker-
mende faktore was en ander wat risikofaktore was. Hierdie faktore het die kans op gevalle van
bedrog verhoog of verminder. Daar is gevind dat wanneer ’n debietorder (DO) met ’n ouer
persoon geassosieer word, dit meer waarskynlik as bedrog geklassifiseer word as wanneer die DO
met ’n jonger persoon geassosieer word. Dit is ook gevind dat as ’n DO ’n waarde van R99 en
R45 het, die kans dat dit ‘n bedrogsaak sal wees, meer sal vergroot.
LR-modelle lewer gelykstaande resultate aan die meer ingewikkelde SVM-modelle met ’n baie
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In a world of rapidly changing financial technology, security has become an ever pressing issue.
The security of a financial system is critical to all participants of this system. Identifying
security threats is an expensive and time consuming process, especially since many threats are
only identified after they have caused damage. This means detection of threats like fraud have to
be proactive. The need for evolving fraud detection methods is critical to the continued security
of a financial system. The objective of this study is to describe what automated payment
fraud looks like in South Africa and to present a possible solution for fraud identification using
machine learning techniques. This chapter begins with the background of the debit order (DO)
environment in South Africa, followed by the research questions and objectives. The research
design, scope and expectations of the study are then discussed. The final component of this
chapter is to outline the remaining chapters of the study.
1.1 Introduction and Background
The DO, internationally known as Direct Debit (DD), is a widely used payment method among
banking clients in South Africa. The average monthly volume of Non-Authenticated Early Debit
Order (NAEDO) transactions in quarter two of 2018 was 14.7 million debit orders; of which 1.9
million debit orders were disputed per month [43]. The volume of payments flowing through
the debit order payment system is tremendous with the value of these debit orders equating to
several trillion Rands per month.
A debit order is an instruction given by a client for a collector to collect funds, via an intermediary
bank, from their account [53]. An example of this is a recurring payment [2], such as a utility
bill from a client to a company, where the company initiates the payment collection. The client
in this case has an account with Bank 1 and the company has an account with Bank 2. The
1
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2 Chapter 1. Introduction
sponsoring bank is Bank 2 and the collector is the company. The company has a mandate to
collect a certain amount of money from the client’s bank account at Bank 1, where Bank 2
initiates the collection on behalf of the company on an agreed-upon date.
The interaction between Bank 1 and Bank 2 is managed by a Payment Clearing House (PCH)
[68], or in South Africa it is known as a Payment Clearing House System Operator (PSO) [74].
The PSO will facilitate the payment and settlement between the banks.
The debit order function globally, and specifically in South Africa, has seen abundant use as
a payment method due to the interoperability of banks. Interoperability is defined as: "The
ease of interlinking different systems on a technological level" by the South African Reserve
Bank (SARB) [44]. SARB goes further saying interoperable systems lead to the development of
large network externalities, which decreases operational cost and increases the simplicity for the
client due to economies of scale [44]. The degree of interoperability of the inter-bank payment
systems is an indication of technological capability and demonstrates the maturity of a nation’s
financial sector.
There are multiple DO systems that operate within the debit order environment, namely the
Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) debit order and the Early Debit Order (EDO). Within the
EDO environment there are two major subsystems: Authenticated Early Debit Order (AEDO)
and NAEDO [4]. DebiCheck, which will be referred to as Authenticated Collection (A/C) for the
remainder of the research, also falls into the EDO collection’s environment with some notable
differences to AEDO and NAEDO. These payment systems and their unique characteristics will
be defined in greater detail in the next chapter.
The EFT is the most basic form of a debit order [74]. In such a transaction the mandate is
granted to the collector by the client. In the case of an EFT, the amount deducted could be
variable. A mandate is defined as: "an official order or commission to do something" [67], in the
case of debit order collection the official order is given to collect money on behalf of a collector
from a client’s account. This is a contractual agreement in most cases and if the collection is
rejected (or disputed) the contract is violated and legal recourse may be taken by the collector.
The EDO is a variant of the EFT debit order where collection is done earlier in the day [74].
The processing of these debit orders early in the day, specifically early in the morning (between
01H00 and 04H00), services a niche of debit order clients and collectors who require a debit
order which runs immediately after the salary is deposited into the client’s account [4].
The EDO is used widely in South Africa and is operated with or without an authorised mandate,
giving rise to both the AEDO and the NAEDO. EDO was a significant change in the payment
environment as it allowed collectors to pull money from accounts early in the morning before
money could be withdrawn from an account. This decreased the risk of insufficient funds when
collecting from a client’s account and was particularly useful in the case of unsecured credit
collections.
Clients are able to dispute DO payments and have the money refunded to their accounts. Most
debit order disputes come about for two reasons [16]:
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• the cash management DO dispute, where clients dispute the payment to a collector due to
a lack of money and the need of the money. In this case legitimate debit order payments
are disputed leading to abuse of the payment system [72];
• and the fraudulent DO dispute, where a client disputes a debit order payment because
the debit order was fraudulent, after which a stop order is put into place to block future
collection attempts.
Both types of debit order disputes have been cause for concern in the South African payment
environment. The SARB considered the replacement of the NAEDO system. In 2013 the
directive was given to develop the A/C payment system [54].
The existence of organised crime syndicates in South Africa has lead to large scale investigations
into fraudulent debit order abuse amounting to at least R1.6bn per year being debited from
South Africans [34]. Masela, head of the National Payment System (NPS), has said that A/C is
designed to curb the fraudulent debit orders and remove the rogue elements from the NPS [34].
The abusive dispute behaviour has grown large enough to justify the implementation of an
entirely new payment system. The classification of fraudulent and non-fraudulent DOs will be
the main objective of this research.
1.2 Research Questions
The main research question is: Can fraudulent DOs be identified using machine learning tech-
niques?
The supplementary research questions that will be answered are:
• what does the automated (DO) payment environment look like;
• what machine learning algorithms are available for this problem; and
• using a case study, can fraudulent DOs be identified reliably?
The research questions were used to define the research objectives.
1.3 Research Objectives
The main research objective will be to classify fraudulent and non-fraudulent DOs. A single,
holistic case study of a bank that participates in the industry will feature the DO environment.
Looking at the literature review and the case study separately, the below research objectives are
listed.
A literature survey will be used to:
• describe the components of the payment system, interoperability and the four party model;
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• define debit orders and the different types of payment systems;
• describe debit order disputes and abuse;
• describe fraud in the DO environment; and
• identify applicable models to identify fraud.
A case study will be used to:
• describe conditions for ML model application;
• apply ML models to the case study data; and
• define and apply model diagnostics and performance measurements to establish whether
results are valid and reliable.
These objectives are linked to the research problems and aim to address the research questions.
The research objectives are used to inform the research design.
1.4 Research Design
The ultimate goal for this research is to classify fraudulent DOs. Fraud in this area poses a risk
to citizens and, if left unchecked, the problem will grow and become more difficult to contain.
This is why it is imperative to identify fraudulent behaviour and flag DOs that look to defraud
citizens.
For the above reasons a deductive research approach was chosen. With sufficient data and using
machine learning techniques a model can be created that identifies fraudulent DOs. This research
is exploratory in nature since the successful answering of the objective leads to insight gained
in other areas. These areas are client behaviour and the mechanics of fraud in the automated
payments space.
The use of primary data was not considered since high quality secondary data was obtained
from a reputable bank within the automated payments environment.
1.5 Scope and Assumptions
The research will be restricted to EFT and EDO methods of payment, none of the other payment
methods available in South Africa will be considered.
The data used will not be linked to any client in particular or in general.
In no instance will the details of clients be considered within the data. The source of the data (a





There are several key expectations. The first expectation is to describe the current state of the
debit order environment, by exploring the abuse within the automated payment systems and
describing, in particular, fraudulent DO abuse.
Secondly, it is expected to classify DOs accurately (whether they are fraudulent or not) and
to deliver a model that is built using field data as opposed to randomly generated data. It is
expected that the results produced are valid and reliable.
1.7 Chapter Layout
This thesis will be broken into chapters roughly based on the layout specified by Bell et al. [5].
The remaining chapters are:
Chapter 2 and 3: Literature review
The necessary theoretical background is discussed in this section. The practical knowledge on
DOs and ML are also discussed and analysed. The main objective is to understand the South
African payments system as it applies to debit orders, how fraud occurs within the system and
how machine learning techniques can be used to identify fraud.
Chapter 4: Research design and methodology
This chapter discusses the research design and methodology. Information about data collection,
data analysis and presentation of results are provided in this section of the thesis. This will
include the transformation of the data from the raw form to the final input into the classification
model; how the models are validated and tested for reliability; and how the relative performance
of each model is measured against one another.
Chapter 5: Results
In this section the results obtained in Chapter 4 are discussed. The data transformation, validity,
reliability and model performance results are displayed and analysed. The models are compared
and the necessary performance metrics are compared.
Chapter 6: Conclusions and recommendations
Using the results from the previous chapters, conclusions about the South African payments
system and DO fraud are made. Conclusions and comparisons are made between the different
models. The final recommendations and possible future studies are discussed.
This chapter summarised the basic DO environment and demonstrated the need for intervention
as far as DO fraud detection goes. The research questions were stated followed by the research
objectives. The research objectives will be reassessed in the final chapter. The basic research
design was stated followed by the scope and expectations of this research. The final section gave
the layout for the rest of the research. The first thing to consider is the literature regarding DOs
and automated payments.
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The purpose of this study is to identify fraudulent DOs using ML techniques. This chapter
will describe fraudulent DOs which is the first major component of the overall objective. The
first concept to be discussed is how a payment works and how it operates within the four party
payment model. The interoperability between banks and clients is then discussed followed by
a description of debit order payments. The two major groups of DO payments are discussed
followed by a description of disputes and fraud in the DO environment.
2.1 Introduction
Globally many people use automated payments on a daily basis in one way or another. In fact, if
an individual is paid a salary of a recurring amount, on a set date, it is considered an automated
payment. Despite the vast use of automated payments, there is limited academic work done on
DOs. There is more research available on DDs [36], the European equivalent to South Africa’s
DO.
Table 2.1 provides a list of keywords and databases used in the searches for this study. Finance,
economics, government and legal databases were searched using specific keywords. The keywords
searched on the different databases in Table 2.1 yielded several types of academically published
material. This was predominantly limited to textbooks only accessible via universities, journal
articles and government legislation gazettes.
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Research Field Database Key words
Finance and Economics EBSCO Host Four party model
Scopus Interoperability
Debit order (or direct debit)
EFT debit order
Early debit order
DO (or direct debit) disputes
DO (or direct debit) fraud
Government and Legal Sabinet Legal Four party model
Westlaw (international law) Interoperability
Debit order (or direct debit)
EFT debit order
Early debit order
DO (or direct debit) disputes
DO (or direct debit) fraud
Table 2.1: Table of keywords and databases searched.
The concept of payments, the four party model, interoperability, and the broader idea of an
automated payment (or debit order) are all widely researched in other countries where research
has been conducted. For these sections there is a larger focus on academic material.
Sections which are unique to South Africa are: EFT DO, EDO, disputes in the debit order
environment and fraud in the debit order environment. These payment systems and topics only
occur in South Africa. This limits the scope of the academic literature on the above mentioned
subjects to newspaper articles, government position papers and technical requirements of the
system administrators.
The first concept to be discussed is a payment. It is a simple and well understood concept, but
needs to be defined to give context to what a DO payment is.
2.2 Payments
A payment is a simple concept of the transfer of value (usually in the form of currency) from
one party to another. The method in which the payment takes place can vary drastically,
complicating the concept of a payment. The Bank for International Settlement (BIS) [13]
claims that South Africa has a diverse payment environment, with highly sophisticated payment
methods in the metropolitan areas. In rural areas a cash-based system is required. There is a
need for multiple forms of payments in South Africa to service the needs of both sophisticated
users and unsophisticated users.
The SARB is responsible for oversight and implementation of the NPS and has given the
Payments Association of South Africa (PASA) the necessary jurisdiction to monitor the NPS
[74]. The duties and responsibilities of the SARB include the provision of management, ad-
ministrative, operational, regulatory and supervisory services for the NPS [52]. The SARB will
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issue directives that contain binding rules addressing system risk and position papers containing
guidelines to foster sound practice to PASA [13].
The PASA maintains the NPS which includes automated payments. The PASA assists the
SARB with oversight of the NPS and the participating members by imposing penalties and
fines for non-compliance. In 1998 the SARB introduced the South African Multiple Option
Settlement (SAMOS) system which helped align South Africa with developed countries, allowing
the South African NPS to be considered among the best in the world [13].
The banks of South Africa operate within the NPS and make use of systems such as SAMOS.
The continued development and refinement of the NPS have allowed the financial sector, and
therefore the banking sector, to become one of the most sophisticated in the world. Despite
being considered one of the leading banking sectors globally, there is still fraud in the banking
environment [64] and continuous action needs to be taken to eradicate the loopholes that exist
in the system.
Having assessed the concept of a payment and the environment which regulates payments, it is
necessary to describe how a payment works within this environment.
2.3 The Four Party System and Payment Clearing Houses
Before transactions were facilitated by banks, transactions used to be conducted via barter
exchange or through a common, non-monetary currency. Banks came into existence and began
facilitating transactions for clients who both belonged to the same bank, this system is known
as the three party payment model [74]. In this case, there is a buyer, a seller and a bank.
The SARB makes use of a payment framework known as the four-party payment model [74]. A
four party model has the following four parties in a transaction: a buyer, the buyer’s bank, a
seller and the seller’s bank, refer to Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The four party payment model.
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The SARB is responsible for the implementation and oversight of this payment system. The
bank-to bank relationship is known as the interbank relationship and the SARB is the only
institution allowed to settle interbank obligations in the form of cash or passing entries across
individual books of banks [13].
According to Volker, there are three relationships that exist between the parties in the four
party model [74]:
• buyer-to-seller: this relationship is commercial in nature. The rendering of a service or
the sale of goods is always involved in this relationship;
• bank-to-client: this relationship is in the competitive sphere. Banks compete for clients
by offering variable products in an attempt to increase their own market share and thus
increase their profit; and
• bank-to-bank: this relationship is cooperative in nature, where increased cooperation al-
lows for better service to be rendered to both banking clients.
The bank-to-bank relationship facilitates the execution of a debit order. Although the seller and
the buyer are the main beneficiaries of the transaction, it is due to the presence and cooperation
of the banks, in the interbank sphere, that the transaction is able to occur. The nature of a
debit order is also that it is automated, meaning that the buyer and the seller do not need to
intervene with the process once the debit order has been initiated.
This is where the concept of interoperability becomes important.
2.4 Interoperability
The need for interoperability in the NPS increased during the past 20 years. For each of the
systems (EFT and EDO) banks needed to collaborate with each other, leading to an increase in
electronic collaboration and ever increasing system complexity [23].
In many cases the word interoperability refers to the ability of computer systems to interact
with each other. This is also the case for the NPS; however, the definition includes the extent
to which institutions (PSO and banks) collaborate [44].
The benefits of achieving interoperability are:
• widespread access and convenience for clients as they can purchase using their bank cards
at any seller and the payment will be processed correctly;
• increased customer value through increased functionality of their banking services;
• increased supplier competition and decreased monopolisation of certain industries; and
• positive network effects which give rise to economies of scale.
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Economies of scale can be considered as the biggest benefit as it affects most people [74]. Volker
[74] uses the telephone network example: if there are only two telephone users the cost-to-benefit
of having the telephone is at its highest; however, the more people on the telephone network
the lower the cost-to-benefit is. This means that the more people use the telephone network the
more valuable the telephone becomes to each individual user.
The interbank environment is supplemented by an important institution known as a PCH,
in South Africa the PCH is BankServ and is regulated by PASA. The PCH is responsible
for settlement and clearance of transactions between banks [13]. Clearing is defined as: "the
exchange of payment instructions" [68] by the SARB.
Debit orders are payments that move through the NPS and are a good example of implementing
a system to the benefit of interoperability.
2.5 Debit Order Payments
A debit order is a type of automated payment. The ombudsman for banking defines the payment
as: "an agreement between you and a third party in which you authorise or mandate the third
party to collect money from your account for goods or services" [48]. Debit orders are frequently
used for recurring payments such as mobile phone contracts or utility bills. In South Africa there
are two types of debit orders in existence, EFT and EDO [74], with a third, A/C [51] to be fully
introduced by the end of 2020. The introduction of A/C is directly as a result of problems with
the EDO system. These problems are partly due to the placement of the mandate with the
"Collector" in the four-party payment system, refer to Figure 2.2.
All debit orders require a mandate and the authorisation of the mandate. A mandate is defined
as "an official order or commission to do something" [67]. In the case of debit orders the mandate
is held by the seller (collector in Figure 2.2). This means that if a buyer (client in Figure 2.2)
wishes to dispute the DO transaction, the money will be refunded [74]; however, the seller will
have to produce the mandate as proof that the transaction is valid.
The fact that the mandate is held by the seller (collector) and not the banks or the PSO, creates
the main loophole in the system that is abused by fraudsters. This is discussed in a later section
of this chapter.
The main goal of debit orders is to increase convenience to the debit order user through auto-
mated payments of regular/recurring amounts and ease of interaction between banks for these
payments. Important aspects of the debit order product are [2]:
• payment flexibility which allows for variable amounts to be debited;
• pre-authorised debit order collection; and
• a guarantee that funds will be refunded upon debit order dispute within a given time
frame.
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Figure 2.2: Debit pull four party payment model.
Debit orders may be disputed by the client in the following situations [48]:
• the client did not authorise the debit order that was debited;
• the deduction from the client’s account is in contravention with the debit order’s authority;
• the client instructed the collector to cancel the debit order; and
• the client stopped (or blocked) the debit order instruction.
The guarantee that cash will be refunded upon dispute of the debit order is a strong incentive
for clients to dispute debit orders when they have limited funds [51]. This introduces one form
of debit order dispute abuse known as "cash management" [72]. The second form of debit order
disputes is fraudulent in nature and will be discussed later in this chapter.
The above section gives an overview of the concept of a DO payment in the context of South
Africa. The following section will briefly describe the two largest DO systems.
2.6 EFT and EDO
The debit order that has been in use the longest is the EFT debit order. These debit orders
are processed in batches at the end of each day [74]. The second category of debit orders are
the EDOs and these are processed early in the morning [74]. There are two types of EDO debit
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orders, namely AEDO and NAEDO [48]. The difference between the two is the authentication
of the mandate. The AEDO is authenticated, meaning that the debit order is more difficult
to dispute for the client. AEDO will not be discussed in detail in this review as it is largely a
static service and is unaffected by fraud due to the authenticated mandate. The NAEDO is not
authenticated which means that the burden of proof of the mandate falls on the collector if the
debit order is disputed.
The EDO was introduced in 2006 to eliminate a problem known as "sorting-at-source", this is
the process whereby the beneficiary of payment instructions sorts the payment instructions of
each bank together and then submits those payment instructions directly to each paying bank
[52]. The result of this was preferential treatment for certain parties; and the consequence was
anti-competitive behaviour.
The EFT DOs and the EDOs allow for major movements in funds throughout South Africa.
Abuse and fraud in these spaces lead to losses to both the general public and banking institutions.
The next section will explore the idea of debit order abuse and how it is connected to fraud in
the NPS.
2.7 Disputes and Fraud in the DO Environment
With the implementation of any new payment system there will be fraudsters and abusers that
take advantage of loopholes in the system [14]. The EDO system, and more specifically the
NAEDO system, is no exception. There are two types of abuse in the NAEDO system, namely
cash-management disputes and fraudulent debit orders [51]. Both of these types of DO abuse
will be described, beginning with fraudulent DOs.
The basis of many fraudulent debit orders (DDs) in Europe is identity theft, where a fraudster:
"knowingly uses a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, aid or
abet any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation law" [22]. Coppolino et al. identify four
different situations where fraud is committed using the debit order system, these four situations
are [14]:
1. Location-independent service fraud: The goal of the fraudster is to benefit from a service
without paying for it. Services included in this type of fraud are mobile phone contracts
of media service providers;
2. Location-bound service fraud: The goal of the fraudster is to benefit from a service without
paying for it. A gym membership is an example of a location-bound service fraud;
3. Address spoofing: The goal of the fraudster is to gain money. In this case the fraudster
will steal an identity, set up a DD using this identity and order equipment to a location
where the equipment can be collected by the fraudster; and
4. Fake company fraud: The goal of the fraudster is to gain money. The fraudster sets up a
DD to debit an account without the knowledge of the account holder.
The most applicable situation in South Africa is fake company fraud. This is where a fraudster
pretends to be a legitimate creditor, with the aim of setting up debit orders with a client and
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collecting these debit orders under the pretence of being a legitimate company. Most of the
debit order fraud in South Africa is committed using this method of defrauding clients [51].
A pensioner tells of her experience with fraudulent debit orders where four different companies
debit amounts from her account that amount to R238 [56]. Since the amounts per individual
debit order is below a certain threshold (usually R100), there is no message triggered to notify
the victim that funds have been deducted from her account [9]. This way the debit order operates
without the victim noticing. The pensioner mentioned earlier only noticed that she had these
fraudulent debit orders when her legitimate debit orders failed to debit due to insufficient funds,
after which she consulted her bank statement for more detail [56].
Certain individuals have had particularly negative experiences with debit orders, where they are
defrauded for months, only realising after inspecting their bank statements that they had their
money stolen. In addition to the loss of funds, the clients also have to pay fees for the fraudulent
debit order. The final straw for many clients is when the banks facilitating the fraudulent debit
orders say to the clients that "debit orders have nothing to do with them as it is between me
(the client) and to whomever I give permission to take my money" [29].
Certain banks have taken action to combat the debit order abuse/fraud mentioned previously
[9]. A certain South African bank traditionally had a debit notification limit of R100, where a
prevalent scam would initiate debit orders at R99, maximising the amount debited and limiting
the possibility of being uncovered. This scam is known as the "R99 scam". This bank decided
to reduce the notification limit to R30 which meant that debit orders that operate at R99 would
be identified, disputed and blocked [10].
Along with the increase in action taken by certain banks, there has been an increase in action
taken by the regulatory institutions after the notable increase in disputes and fraud in the debit
order space [69]. Clients were advised to check their bank statements on a regular basis to
identify unauthorised transactions on their accounts [47]. This advice goes beyond debit orders.
Consumers were also reminded that they have the right to dispute or instruct their bank to
reverse debit orders they have not agreed to or are processed outside the mandate they have
given [47].
The above behaviour in the market leads to an investigation conducted by the large banks and
regulators in South Africa, SARB and South African Revenue Services (SARS). At the time the
report was written three large debit order scam syndicates had been identified operating out of
Kwa-Zulu Natal [10]. It has been estimated that as many as 750,000 fraudulent debit orders
may have been implemented across the country’s five major banks – totalling R74 million [10]
per month.
The account numbers of clients are illegally obtained after which a company (fraudulent compa-
nies in most cases) then set up these payments without the knowledge of the client [47]. Once
the account numbers have been obtained call centre operators contact the unsuspecting clients
and then proceed to instate, with relative ease, debit orders, under a false company name, on
the clients’ account [64]. Despite efforts on behalf of the industry, blacklisting these fraudulent
companies has been difficult since it only requires the name of the company to be replaced with
a new name and the debit order will continue debiting the account [10].
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The second major cause of disputes in the debit order environment is cash-management disputes.
This is where a client disputes an already collected debit order in order to gain the refunded
cash [51]. Clients dispute the legitimate debit order as the funds are reversed immediately and
transferred back into the client’s account which creates a temporary cash flow relief for the client
[66]. This type of dispute falls outside the scope of this study.
Banks charge a fee for disputed debit orders which range in size. Debit order disputes lead to
financial strain on consumers and it is particularly lower income groups that bear the brunt [45].
Since the client is in control of disputes the banks use their own discretion as to how large the
penalty fee is. Certain banks charge an administration fee and other banks charge a punishment
fee when a debit order is disputed which leads to further abuse of clients [3]. The unfortunate
result of these larger penalty fees is that the client ends up in a worse financial situation [48].
Many clients suffer as a result of DO abuse, it is often the financially illiterate that suffer the
most from these scammers. Banks are also using resources to curb the effect of DO abuse which
could increase the quality of the client’s experience.
The concept of a debit order and the fundamental principles of how a debit order functions were
explored initially. Afterwards the idea of DO fraud was introduced with a description of how
this problem comes about. The next chapter describes classification methods used to identify
fraud.
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The previous chapter shows how clients lose money to scams and how some banks combat the
fraudsters. The use of machine learning presents the possibility to produce a more refined and
long-term solution to the DO fraud problem. The literature pertaining to machine learning and
payment fraud detection is explored further in this chapter.
The ML process will be described, followed by an in-depth discussion about LR. The LR
section will explore the fundamental concepts surrounding the classification method as well as
the conditions necessary for applying LR. The concept of feature selection will then be explored,
followed by a discussion on model performance and confusion-based metrics. After the LR
sections are discussed, SVM will be considered. The fundamentals of SVMs will be discussed
first, followed by the conditions for applying SVMs. Feature selection and model performance
applied to SVM will then be discussed. The final section of this chapter considers relevant fraud
detection research.
3.1 Machine Learning
Identifying DO disputes is a major problem as it is abundant among all corners of society and
is hidden among large amounts of raw data. Using ML methods to help in the identification of
fraudulent DOs will allow individuals to identify and block fraudulent scams before they get a
chance to infiltrate the individual bank accounts.
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The purpose of ML is to learn from the data [15]. The machine learning algorithms can be
grouped into three main categories based on knowledge about the output (Y) variable: super-
vised, semi-supervised and unsupervised learning [31]. Supervised learning requires a data set
where the output (Y) variable is labelled, and the objective of modelling with this methodology
is to attempt to classify the output variable as accurately as possible. Unsupervised learning on
the other hand requires no labelled output variable, the objective of this modelling approach is
to find patterns between variables and describe the structure within the data. Semi-supervised
learning requires some of the observations with, and other observations without labelled output
(Y) variables, with the aim of labelling unlabelled output variables [31].
The DO data used in the case study has enough labelled (as fraudulent or non-fraudulent)
cases/observations to train a model with, so the main focus in this research will be supervised
learning and the associated process, shown in Figure 3.1, is followed.
Figure 3.1: Supervised machine learning workflow [37].
Using the process flow shown in Figure 3.1, it should be possible to create a classifier capable of
identifying fraud using the input variables (input variables will also be referred to as features)
of the fraudulent (DO) records together with a classification method. The records are split into
a training set and a test set. The model will be trained on the former, and tested on the latter;
after which the model must be optimised to not over-fit the data and to reduce variance to a
suitable level [31].
Since the DO data has a labelled output variable, the method used for classification will be in
the supervised school of statistical learning [12]. The independent features will be modelled to
classify the dependent categorical variables. Not all features are relevant to the categorical vari-
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able so feature selection is performed to isolate only features that are relevant to the dependent
variable.
Using the optimal subset of features produced from the feature selection process, a classifier
needs to be tested on the data. Since the output variable, whether the DO is fraudulent or not,
is categorical, a classification technique can be used for modelling [31]. There are two classifiers
considered in the modelling process: LR and SVM. These methods are common in the fraud
detection sphere as will be seen in Section 3.4. The reasons that these classification methods
were chosen instead of other methods is because of the applicability to the dichotomous data set;
the relative simplicity of LR compared to the complexity of SVM; both of these classification
methods produced linearly separable decision boundaries; and they are often grouped together
for comparison [31].
The model produced using an LR classifier has a good middle ground between the classification
strength and the simplicity of interpreting the result produced [31]. The model produced by
an SVM classifier does not have much interpretability, but has as high potential for good clas-
sification accuracy. SVM is frequently considered a "black box" classification solution since it
gives a result, but is difficult to interpret. SVM is also considered an "out-of-the-box" solution
since it produces good results without manual intervention [31]. Figure 3.2 below shows the
trade-off between model flexibility and model interpretability. LR and SVM lie on opposite
sides of this spectrum despite the fact that they are often compared to one another, as will be
seen in Section 3.4.
Figure 3.2: Trade-off between model flexibility and interpretability [31].
The first classification method to be discussed in detail is LR followed by SVM.
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3.2 Logistic Regression
In this section the LR component of the modelling process will be discussed. The fundamen-
tal components of logistic regression are discussed initially, including concepts, conditions and
reasons for application.
3.2.1 Fundamentals of Logistic Regression
LR is one of the most widely used classification methods and seeks to model the probability
that an output variable belongs to a particular category or group [19]. The probability that the
output variable belongs to a specific group always lies between 0 and 1.
The binary random (dichotomous) variable as defined by Dobson and Barnett [17] is:
Y =
{
1 if the outcome is a success
0 if the outcome is a failure.
(3.1)
The relationship between the input variable X and the binary response variable Y is given by
equation (3.2). The functional form of the logistic regression function is given by




where P is the probability that the binary output variable Y is a success, X is an input variable,
β0 is a constant and β1 is the coefficient of input variable X.
With some manipulation the below equation can be produced,
(1− P ) = 1
1 + eβ0+β1X
, (3.3)
then the odds ratio is
P
(1− P )
= eβ0+β1X . (3.4)
The value P(1−P ) is called the odds. This value can range from 0 to∞ and indicates the likelihood
of an event occurring. On average 1 in 5 DOs with an odds of 1/4 are fraudulent, since P = 0.2
it implies an odds of 0.2(1−0.2) = 1/4, as an example [31].






= β0 + β1X. (3.5)
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Equation (3.5) implies that β1 has an impact on X. This impact is when X is increased by one
unit the log odds changes by β1, or equivalently it multiplies the odds by eβ1 [31].
The link between the linear function,
f(X) = β0 + β1X, (3.6)






, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (3.7)
for a specific observation i, pi is the probability of being classified as fraudulent, β0 is a constant,
β1 is the coefficient of X and the total number of observations is n. Equation (3.7) is often
referred to as the logit (or logistic) function for an observation yi.
The shape of the logit function is shown in Figure 3.3. This solid "S" shaped line is when the
logit of a binary variable, on the vertical axis, is plotted against a given input variable (X), on
the horizontal axis. The probability of the binary variable being classified as fraudulent cannot
exceed 1 and cannot be less than 0. For a given value of X an associated probability of Y being
classified as fraudulent is given. For a cut-off value of 0.5, p(Y ) > 0.5 gives a value of 1 and
p(Y ) < 0.5 gives a value of 0. The cut-off value used in this research is 0.5. This means that a
continuous response variable p(Y ) is transformed into a dichotomous response variable.








Figure 3.3: Logit function for binary output variable.
The dashed line in Figure 3.3 shows a linear equation f(X) = β0 + β1X. Linear regression uses
a straight line whereas LR uses a sigmoid shape to fit the distribution. The sigmoid shape fits
the dichotomous output variable better than the linear model, as shown in Figure 3.3.
In many situations where an attempt is made to identify fraud, it is often required to flag
fraudulent instances on a case-by-case basis. This means that the output variable is dichotomous
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and logistic regression is an ideal model for such situations. This is seen in Table 3.5 where LR is
applied in many studies. In addition to this ideal situation for applying LR there are additional
advantages of using LR over other models. The main advantages of LR are:
• LR output can be analysed and the model is interpretable [31];
• LR makes no assumptions about the underlying distribution of the predictors [26]; and
• LR is relatively quick to train, specifically when compared to more complex models such
as SVMs.
Having described the fundamental concepts and advantages of LR, it is necessary to describe
the conditions for applying the model.
3.2.2 Conditions for Application of LR
The following list considers the conditions that need to be met before logistic regression can be
applied to a data set:
• the dependent variable (Y) is dichotomous (binary) [35];
• the assumption of the linear relationship between the logit of the dependent variable and
each continuous predictor variable (X) must be confirmed [26];
• multicollinearity must be removed [26]; and
• the sample size adequacy needs to be confirmed [26].
The above conditions need to be confirmed before the LR model can be applied. If the conditions
are not confirmed then there is a possibility that the resulting model may, but not necessarily,
have underlying issues. These issues may cause poor classification performance of the model.
Condition 1 (Dichotomy of output variable)
When fraud is considered it is necessary to assess each case individually for being fraudulent.
This means that the fraud investigation has a binary output variable that can be either 1 or 0.
Logistic regression assumes an output variable which is dichotomous (binary) [35]. In the case
of this research that assumption is met inherently as the dependent variable is whether a DO
is fraudulent or not. The value of 1 is given to fraudulent observations and 0 to non-fraudulent
observations.
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Condition 2 (Independent variable linearity)
The LR classifier requires a linear relationship between continuous independent variables and
the logit of the output variable [35]. This is inspected visually by plotting each continuous
variable against the logit of the output variable.
The consequence of non-linearity in some of the variables is an inaccurate model. Since logistic
regression is a linear model the decision boundary will be linear. Non-linearity in some variables
will not fit the decision boundary and will decrease prediction accuracy.
Condition 3 (Multicollinearity)
When analysing data and building models around certain data sets a problem arises when some
of the variables in the data set display similar behaviour to other variables in the data set. An
example of such a situation is when one variable is used to create another variable, this is known
as a derived variable. The derived variable may behave in the same way as the first variable,
this is known as collinearity. Collinearity also exists between input variables when one input
variable can be linearly predicted from the other input variables with a substantial degree of
accuracy.
The presence of multicollinear variables in a data set means remedial action is required to remove
the highly correlated variables from the data set before modelling takes place. The simplest way
of detecting collinearity is by examining the correlation matrix of the input variables. When
the absolute value of the correlation between two variables is high (close to 1) then collinearity
is present [31]. Using this method with multicollinear variables is not that simple as a lower
correlation value may be present for three or more variables that are highly correlated [31].
The degree of multicollinearity can be determined by calculating the variance inflation factor





, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, (3.8)
where R2j is the coefficient of determination for the regression of Xj on the remaining k inde-
pendent variables.
According to Mansfield and Helms [40] assessing VIFs is a good method for detecting multi-
collinearity. This method is superior to manual inspection of a correlation matrix since it is able
to detect multicollinearity more objectively.
The VIF is used in the results component of this research. The smallest possible value for the
VIF is 1, with values between 5 and 10 considered to be problematic [31]. Any variable with a
VIF above 10 should be excluded. A VIF cut-off value of 5 will be used in this research.
According to James et al. [31], there are two approaches to dealing with collinear variables. The
first is to combine the two variables into a single input variable and the second solution is to
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
24 Chapter 3. Literature Review: Machine Learning
simply drop one of the collinear variables. Dropping one of the two collinear variables does not
hinder the modelling process as collinearity implies that the information contained in the one
variable is contained within the other [31].
Condition 4 (Sample size adequacy)
Sample size adequacy is a required condition when applying LR classification [35]. Bujang et
al. [8] recommend the following calculation for determining sample size adequacy:
n = 100 + 50k, (3.9)
where n is the minimum sample size and k is the number of independent variables. The above
calculation gives a recommended minimum sample size; however, in many real circumstances
this minimum is very low and a sample size many times larger than the required minimum is
used in the modelling process.
Each of the above conditions needs to be assessed when applying LR to a data set to ensure
that the result is reliable. Once the conditions are assessed the next step in the ML process,
feature selection, is considered.
3.2.3 Feature Selection and Extraction
A feature can be defined as: "an individual measurable property of the process being observed"
[12]. To determine whether a DO is fraudulent or not, features (or variables) will be used to
identify and classify the nature of the DO. There are many features associated with a DO
and its user. Feature selection has three main advantages, namely: increasing the classification
accuracy of the model by decreasing dimensionality; decreasing computational requirements;
and increasing the general understanding of the data [12].
Reducing the number of features often reduces the variance of a model at a small expense of
bias. This leads to significant increases in the model accuracy and the prediction accuracy on
the test set [31]. Reducing the number of variables/features allows for greater interpretability
as fewer variables need to be explained giving a less complex model as output [31]. Both of
the above advantages lead to the third advantage which is decreasing the computational power
required to produce the model. Since there are less input variables being fed into the model,
the calculations required to produce the model decreases allowing for a quicker result.
Feature selection must not be confused with the removal of collinear variables. The presence
of collinear variables may undermine the validity of a model; whereas, feature selection may
increase the quality of a model. The removal of collinear variables is a necessity; however,
feature selection can be thought of as a tuning factor for a model. Too many features/variables
in a model may result in over-fitting and to few features may result in under-fitting [24].
Feature selection can be broken into three different methods for decreasing the number of vari-
ables. Firstly, subset selection seeks to reduce the number of input variables by removing those
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that are believed not to influence the output variable. This is known as feature selection. Sec-
ondly, dimension reduction involves projecting the input variables into feature space and creating
transformed variables in the process [31]. This is known as feature extraction. The third method
is known as shrinkage. This method seeks to reduce the coefficient of a variable to as close to zero
as possible. Ridge regression and the Lasso are two examples of shrinkage, but these methods
will not be discussed in this research. Subset selection and dimension reduction will be discussed
in the following sections.
Best subset selection (feature selection)
Subset selection algorithms can be classified into two main groups: filters and wrappers [42].
Filter methods seek to assess the relevance of each feature and wrappers sequentially/allegorically
seek to develop a subset of features. Filter methods can often result in less than optimal subsets
due to the inclusion of irrelevant variables [12]. Wrapper algorithms, such as forward, backward
or stepwise selection, can be computationally intensive and do not always produce the optimal
subset of variables either [12].
Wrapper algorithms, although not perfect, are still powerful and produce improved subsets of
features. In many cases there is an increase in model performance using this feature selection
method. The backward feature selection process is shown below [38]:
1. All of the features are fed to the regression model in the first iteration;
2. the p-value of each feature is assessed against a predefined threshold (usually 0.05);
3. the feature with the least significance, the largest p-value, is removed from the data set;
4. the reduced data set is fed back into the regression model and the next least significant
feature is removed; and
5. the above process is repeated until the p-value of all features in the model are below the
threshold.
Forward feature selection follows the same process; however, the data set begins with one feature.
During each iteration of the regression model a new feature is added and assessed against a p-
value threshold. If the feature has a significance above the threshold it is not considered as
independent variable again.
The algorithms mentioned above can be combined to produce a stepwise feature selection [62].
This method has a higher chance of achieving the optimal set of features, but comes with the
penalty of increased calculation time. Stepwise feature selection is known for being a "greedy"
algorithm [38]. This is a general characteristic of the stepwise school of algorithms. The algo-
rithm relies on trial and error to achieve an optimised subset of features at the cost of increased
calculation time with no guarantee of increases in the model accuracy. The next section, PCA,
approaches the concept of feature selection from a different point of view.
Forward, backward or stepwise algorithms use linear regression as the base learner and the
stepwise feature selection method as the search procedure [38]. There are variations of the
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procedure where the significance of a feature is not necessarily determined by a p-value, but
rather by another performance metric such as model accuracy or Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC).
Dimension reduction (feature extraction)
Dimension reduction methods, like PCA, use high dimensional space, also known as feature
space, to reduce a large number of variables into a low-dimensional set of features. The result
of PCA is an entirely new set of transformed features (or scores) that explains most of the
variability in the data [31].
The use of PCA as a feature selection method requires two conditions to be met. Firstly, it
needs to be determined whether the correlation matrix is appropriate; and secondly, the data
needs to have a multivariate normal distribution [61].
Even though simply increasing the sample size improves the applicability of PCA, there is still a
need to measure the degree of sampling adequacy. Sampling adequacy dictates whether a data
set contains sufficient information to use PCA. The method for measuring sampling adequacy
incorporates the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic [32]. The KMO measure of sampling
adequacy gives an indication of how well the data fits the PCA model by analysing whether a
correlation matrix is appropriate for factor analysis. A KMO value below 0.5 is unacceptable
[21]. According to Kaiser and Rice [33] values between 0.5-0.6 is "miserable" and values between
0.6-0.7 are "mediocre". A KMO cut-off value of 0.7 will be used in this research.












, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, (3.10)
where rij is the correlation coefficient and pij is the partial covariance between variables i and
















which considers all combinations of variables where i 6= j.
Normalisation is used to ensure that the independent variables come from a multivariate normal
distribution [61], in some cases this is also referred to as standardisation or Z-score normalisation.
This means that each feature is transformed to have the same scale, with a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1 (unit variance) [31]. The use of skewed data in PCA dimension reduction
results in skewed component scores [63].




, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (3.12)
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where Zi is the standardised score, Xi is the observation, µ is the average across the sample
and σ is the standard deviation of the sample. The process of using PCA component scores as
a feature selection method is described by James et al. [31].
Once feature selection is done the remaining features are used for classification modelling. At
this point the model is applied and the resulting output is measured. The classification accuracy
will be measured which constitutes the model performance.
3.2.4 Model Performance
Traditional methods such as AIC, Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) or the coefficient of
determination were used to calculate the performance of a model. These are proxy measures
used when it was (and sometimes still is) not practical to evaluate the data using large data sets
[31]. With improvements in computing and increased access to statistical software, the need to
use these proxy performance measures was removed and model performance can be evaluated
using test data sets. The use of a confusion matrix has now become a standard classification
model performance measure, this will be seen in the final section of this chapter.
A confusion matrix used in conjunction with a classification model shows the predicted and
actual classification [73] and allows for the measurement of performance of a model. The con-
fusion matrix is used for two or more classes of the output variable. Since the DO classification
problem has a binary classification the confusion matrix will be 2x2 matrix, with the layout as
shown in Table 3.1.
Actual





ed B - Positive TP FP
Bc- Negative FN TN
Table 3.1: Confusion matrix layout.
A positive outcome (the detection of fraud) gives a value of 1 and a negative outcome (no fraud
detected) gives a value of 0. The actual values are variables from the data set and the predicted
values are output variables from the classification model. The definitions of the matrix cells in
Table 3.1 are as follows:
• TP - True Positive (predicted positive if the actual outcome is positive);
• FP - False Positive (Type I Error) (predicted positive if the actual outcome is negative);
• FN - False Negative (Type II Error) (predicted negative if the actual outcome is positive);
and
• TN - True Negative (predicted negative if the actual outcome is negative).
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The above definitions represent a sum of the number of observations that were classified to one
of these four groups (TP, FP, FN and TN). Using the above mentioned classifications from the
confusion matrix the performance measures, shown in Table 3.2, can be produced.
Measure Formula
Accuracy [73] TP + TN
(TP + FP + FN + TN)
(3.13)
Error [73] FP + FN
(TP + FP + FN + TN)
(3.14)




(TN + FP )
(3.16)
Negative predictive value (NPV) [46] TN
(TN + FN)
(3.17)
Precision (or PPV) [46] TP





Table 3.2: Confusion matrix metrics.
The list of performance variables is extensive; however, the most important metrics, sensitivity,
specificity and accuracy are discussed below.
Sensitivity measures the number of correctly classified fraudulent debit orders [46]. This value
should be as high as possible. Sensitivity can also be referred to as the true positive rate.
Specificity as a measure of accuracy measures in the case of fraud correctly identified non-
fraudulent cases. Specificity is used in the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve and
plays a crucial role in the overall quality of a classification model.
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.2. Logistic Regression 29
Accuracy gives a general indication of how accurate the model classifies both true and false
values [73]. In certain situations this measure is more important than sensitivity; however, in
the fraud space, sensitivity is the more important measure. For all of the above measures the
closer the result is to 1 (or 100%) the better the model is performing.
ROC
The ROC is a popular method of measuring the performance of a classification model. The
graph combines both true positive (or sensitivity) and false positive (or 1-specificity) rates to
show how accurate a model is [31].
Figure 3.4 shows an example of an ROC curve. True positive rates are considered on the vertical
axis and false positive rates are considered on the horizontal axis. The dashed 45◦ line represents
a classification model with a prediction accuracy of 50%, at 50% the model is effectively guessing
























Figure 3.4: ROC Curve.
The better the classification performance of a model the higher the ROC will be above the 45◦
line. An ideal ROC curve will hug the top left corner [31]. The higher the ROC curve is above
the 45◦ line the larger the area under the curve (AUC) is. The AUC should be high for a model
to be considered to have high classification accuracy.
Both ROC and confusion matrix performance measures look specifically at classification accu-
racy; however, there are other performance measures to consider such as AIC.
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AIC
The AIC is a measure that reflects the relative performance of a model and is often used as a
method to choose between models. The AIC seeks to penalise complexity in models and reward
simplicity, prioritising fewer independent variables over more independent variables [38].





2) + 2k, (3.20)
where n is the sample size, yi is the output variable for observation i, ŷi is the predicted value
for the output variable for observation i and k is the number of input variables.
The AIC score of a model needs to be as small as possible and when models are compared using
the AIC the model with the smallest AIC should be chosen. Considering equation (3.20), when
all things remain the same, increasing k will increase the AIC value. AIC as a performance
metric focuses on simplicity and the way to achieve the simplicity is to limit the number of
features to include only the essential features.
McFadden’s Pseudo Coefficient of Determination
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 is designed to measure the predictive capability of a model [39]. The
pseudo R2 measure, like many other measures, needs to be used in conjunction with other
performance metrics. McFadden suggested a suitable minimum value for when a model fits the
data well. The value should be between 0.2 and 0.4 [39].
McFadden’s Psuedo R2 considers the predictive capability of a model and also serves as a
diagnostic check for models.
Hosmer-Lemeshow
The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is used to determine the goodness-of-fit of an LR model on a given
set of data [26]. The test indicates how well the model fits and is used as a diagnostic test. The
predicted values are arranged from the lowest to the highest and the cases are then divided into
groups with approximately equal sizes, treating the known fraudulent and non-fraudulent cases
separately. The observed and expected frequencies are compared in each group within the known
fraudulent and non-fraudulent groups separately. The recommended number of groupings is 10;
however, this number can vary depending on the data set [57].
The test produces a Chi-squared value along with a p-value. The significance level for the p-value
is 0.05. The hypothesis test associated with the Hosmer-Lemeshow test is shown in Table 3.3.
Rejection of theH0 hypothesis does not always imply that there are issues with the model. Using
Hosmer-Lemeshow and McFadden’s Pseudo R2 together gives a clearer view of the quality of
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H0 : The LR model fits the data.
Hα : The LR model does not fit the data.
Table 3.3: Hosmer-Lemeshow hypothesis test.
the model. An example would be to reject the H0 hypothesis of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test
and to obtain an acceptable McFadden Pseudo R2 score. This would mean the model predicts
sufficiently well, but there might be underlying issues present in the model which compromises
the goodness-of-fit.
Although the Hosmer-Lemeshow test is popular there are issues with the test. Hosmer specifies
the following two shortcomings [27]: the test does not take over-fitting into account, and the
choice of the number of groups is determined by the user which can influence the resulting
statistic.
Paul, Pennell and Lemeshow [50] suggest that an increasing sample size can have an undesired
effect on goodness-of-fit tests since small departures from the proposed model are considered
significant when the sample size is large. The following equation suggests the number of groups
required per sample size:






where g is the number of groups and n is the sample size. Equation (3.21) implies that for n
= 500, g = 10 groups are required; for n = 4,000, g = 130 groups are required; and for n =
2,5000, g = 5,002 groups are required. It is suggested that the Hosmer-Lemeshow test cannot
be applied to sample sizes above n = 25,000 since it is required that there should be at least 5
observations per group to prevent an overpowered test [50].
The above-mentioned issues lead to the power of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test often being con-
sidered as low and it is recommended to use the statistic in conjunction with other diagnostic
statistics.
Calculation time
Another method, used in conjunction with the above-mentioned measures, is to measure the
calculation time of each of the models. Some models are mathematically more complex and this
results in higher computation times. The larger a data set grows the higher the computation
time becomes as well. For this reason the computation time will also be included in the results
and used as a comparitive metric.
The above sections described the fundamental concepts underpinning the LR model, followed
by conditions required to apply the model. The concept of feature selection was discussed, after
which the model performance metrics and diagnostics were discussed. The above section focused
specifically on LR; however, the feature selection methods and model performance measures can
also be applied to the SVM models.
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3.3 Support Vector Machine
Having looked at LR, the next section focuses on SVM as a classification method. SVM is a
more complex classification method than LR; however, the two methods have many components
that overlap and, as will be seen in Table 3.5, they are often considered in conjunction with one
another.
This section of the chapter starts with a description of the fundamentals of the SVM classifi-
cation method, followed by conditions required to apply SVM and methods for measuring the
classification performance.
3.3.1 Fundamentals of Support Vector Machines
The support vector machine is a classification method which can be used on binary output
variables. It was developed in the computer science community and can be compared to other
classification methods such as logistic regression [31] since it was originally designed for binary
classification [41].
The SVM is a progressed version of an "intuitive classifier" called the maximal margin classifier
[31]. The objective of this classifier is increasing the separation distance between two groups
of observations as much as possible. The separation of the two groups is done via an optimal
separating hyper-plane which is trained by observations that lie on the edge of either group [41],
these are known as the support vectors [6].
Equation (3.22) is the expression for a hyperplane, where β0 is a constant, β1, . . . , βp are coeffi-
cients and X1, . . . , Xp are observations:
β0 + β2X1 + β2X1 + ...+ βpXp = 0. (3.22)
Note that in two dimensions, (3.22) is the equation of a straight line [31].
The maximal marginal classifier builds on the concept of a hyperplane by attempting to separate
two groups of observations as far as possible. The maximal margin hyperplane is constructed
based on n training observations x1, . . . , xn ∈ Rp with the associated class labels y1, . . . , yn ∈
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p∑
j=1
β2j = 1, (3.24)
yi(β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + ...+ βpxip) ≥M ∀ i = 1, . . . , n, (3.25)
where M is the width of the margin. M should be made as large as possible for an optimal
solution. The maximal margin classifier cannot be applied to most data sets since it requires
that the classes be separable by a linear boundary with no overlapping observation from the
other group. So another method needs to be used when groups overlap, this is where the support
vector classifier can be used.
The support vector classifier is an extension of the maximal margin classifier which is the solution








β2j = 1, (3.27)
yi(β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + ...+ βpxip) ≥M(1− εi), (3.28)
εi ≥ 0, (3.29)
P∑
j=1
εi ≤ C, (3.30)
where M is the width of the margin, C is a non-negative tuning parameter and εi is the slack
variable.
The solution to the above optimisation problem involves the inner products of the observations
and not the observations themselves [31]. The inner product of the two observations xi, xi′ is
given by
〈xi, xi′ 〉 =
P∑
j=1
xij , xi′j . (3.31)
The general form of the linear support vector classifier can be shown in the following form




where αi are the coefficients of feature vectors xi and xj , i = 1, . . . , n, one per training ob-
servation and S is the sample [31]. Replacing the inner product in the equation (3.32) with a
generalisation of the inner product form
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K(xi, xi′ ), (3.33)
results in




where αi are the coefficients of feature vectors xi and xj , i = 1, . . . , n, one per training observa-
tion and S is the sample [31]. The kernel function is denoted by K(xi, xj) in equation (3.34).
The support vector classifier solves the problem of overlapping groups, but it still produces
only a linear solution [31]. In many cases the groups overlap but are not separable by a linear
classification boundary, this is where the support vector machine becomes very relevant. The
support vector machine function is shown in equation (3.34) with the general kernel function
being K(x, xi).
Using kernels the SVM transforms the data by projecting the observations into a hypothetical
space known as a feature space [31]. Many different kernels exist for use by SVMs. Alterna-
tive kernels allow for "varying degrees of non-linearity and flexibility" which may increase the
applicability of the model [19]. Possible SVM kernels can be seen in Table 3.4.
The observations are mapped into the feature space using the kernel, once the observations are
in a higher dimensional space, then the SVM seeks to create a separating hyper-plane between
groups of observations. The hyper-plane can then be used as a function to classify unlabeled
observations [71]. Thus, the SVM can find a linear solution to a non-linear problem, as shown
in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Non-linear boundary produced by a hyperplane in feature space [31].
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It is difficult to find reasons why specific kernels are better than others. It seems researchers
choose a few kernels and see how they perform based on a certain output measure. In many
cases of research, priori knowledge of the data and environment are used to select the kernel
[71]. Each kernel and SVM combination will have tuning parameters, often algorithms are used
to optimise the parameters of the model. Ben-Hur and Weston [6] point out that the specific
choice of kernel is "data-dependent", and recommends testing several kernels (and parameters)
to try and find the optimal kernel.
Referring to Table 3.4, according to Hsu et al. [28] the RBF kernel is a reasonable first choice.
This is because the RBF kernel is better at modelling non-linearity than the linear kernel and in
certain cases the RBF kernel is equivalent to both the linear and sigmoid kernels [28]. When the
RBF kernel is compared to the polynomial kernel, the RBF kernel is much less complex since
the polynomial kernel has more hyper-parameters [28].
When the number of features is very large the application of an RBF kernel may not be suitable
and the use of a linear kernel will be more appropriate [28]. One of the advantages of SVM,
discussed in more detail later, is its applicability to small data sets or data sets where the number
of features are more than the number of observations (n observations < p features).
The most popular kernels are shown in Table 3.4; however, this is not an exhaustive list of
kernels.
Kernel function Formula Parameter
Linear kernel [65]
K(xi, xj) = xi.xj (3.35)
Polynomial kernel [6]
K(xi, xj) = (xi.xj + 1)
d (3.36)
d
Radial basis function (RBF) kernel [6]
K(xi, xj) = exp(−γ||xi.xj ||2) (3.37)
γ < 0
Sigmoid kernel [6]
K(xi, xj) = tanh(b(xi.xj) + c) (3.38)
b,c
Table 3.4: Table of kernels [65] [6].
The applicability of SVMs to data sets with many features and few observations is one of
several advantages of the classification methods. The following are additional advantages of the
modelling method:
• when compared to more widely used classification methods like decision trees and neural
networks, SVMs may be more accurate [41];
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• SVMs works well on small samples, producing high accuracy on small data sets [41];
• from a financial point of view, the high accuracy from small data sets produced by SVMs
means a financial saving in data acquisition [41]; and
• the SVM model can easily move from a linear classifier to a non-linear classifier.
The following are disadvantages of SVMs:
• the output of the SVM is purely dichotomous with no class membership probability [19];
• the results of SVMs are difficult to interpret due to the fact that the method uses a "black
box" and only gives a binary result [31]; and
• the SVM has a complex mathematical setup that results in increased computational power
required to perform the calculations as the sample size increases. This is costly from a
time consumption perspective.
It is interesting to note how the relatively high calculation time of SVMs on larger data sets is a
disadvantage, but the relatively high classification accuracy on smaller data sets demonstrates
the duality of the advantages of SVMs.
Having looked at the fundamental concepts surrounding the SVM it is necessary to consider the
conditions required for apply the model.
3.3.2 Conditions for Application of SVMs
Compared to LR the SVM has fewer conditions. There are two conditions that need to be met
before SVMs are applied.
The first condition for the use of SVMs is normalisation of the input data. According to Ben-Hur
and Weston [6] certain situations of SVM classification can be highly sensitive to the way data is
scaled. It is highly recommended to normalise the data before applying the classification model.
This will become part of the conditions required for the application of SVMs as a classifier
in the research methodology component. Equation (3.12) from the LR section can be used to
standardise the data.
The second condition that is required for use of SVMs is the removal of multicollinearity [38].
This means the same VIF diagnostics (using equation (3.8)) performed when applying LR can
be performed when applying SVMs.
Once the data is prepared and all conditions are met the feature selection process can be applied
to the data set.
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3.3.3 Feature Selection and Model Performance
Mention was made earlier of the similarities between LR and SVM. This is due to the fact that
many of the diagnostic and validation methods used for LR can be used for SVM.
Non-informative variables can negatively affect SVMs [38]. Two feature selection methods are
specified above in the LR section of this chapter. Both of these feature selection methods will
be used to remove non-informative variables from the data before applying SVM.
The model performance for the SVM is done in the same way as with LR. Confusion matrix
measures (see Table 3.2) are used to assess the performance of SVMs. ROC curves will be
considered for each permutation of the model along with calculation time for the training of the
model.
The fundamental concepts of LR and SVMs are discussed in the sections above. The conditions
for applying each method and feature selection methods are also discussed. The confusion
matrix performance measures are discussed for both methods as well. The following section will
consider the above theory and will discuss how other researchers have approached the problem
of identifying fraud.
3.4 Relevant Fraud Detection Research
The use of ML to identify fraud is not a new concept and is widely used in the credit card
industry. In this section we explore the application of ML to detect fraud and critically assess
what other researchers have found in their research. Table 3.5 shows a summary of relevant
research in the field followed by a discussion of the major findings.
Itoo et al. [30] consider the use of machine learning methods on credit card fraud detection. The
methods suggested are logistic regression, Naive Bayes and KNN. Itoo et al. [30] indicate the
problem of skewed data where there is a much larger proportion of non-fraudulent cases than
fraudulent cases, random under-sampling is used as an attempt to overcome this. Random under-
sampling is explained as deliberately taking proportionally less observations from a selected
group, comparing to another group. In this case non-fraudulent cases are under-sampled to
increase the proportion of fraudulent cases in the test sample. The confusion matrix based
performance metrics are used to assess the relative performance of each classification method.
It is found that logistic regression performs the best on the data used in the research, also having
the highest sensitivity.
Peussa et al. [55] suggest the use of logistic regression based score cards for credit default detec-
tion. It is postulated that a "gut feel" approach was used traditionally to determine the ability
of a credit applicant to repay credit. Traditionally the overarching idea of the credit granting
methodology was non-probabilistic. Peussa et al. [55] suggest the use of probability based score
cards as a replacement for the traditional method, with specific use of LR to determine the credit
default rate. AIC and BIC are used to measure the performance of the classification method. It
is found that the statistical (LR) score card method is superior to the non-statistical "gut-feel"
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Table 3.5: Summary of research done on fraud detection.
method.
Awoyemi et al. [1] suggest the use of ML for credit card fraud detection. The data is a real-
world set of credit card transactions. KNN, Naive Bayes and LR are suggested as possible
methods for classification. Two major problems with fraudulent data are explored: the first
is the unbalanced (skewed) nature of fraud data and the second is the continuously changing
client spending behaviour in the credit card market. Proportional sampling is suggested as a
method to deal with the unbalanced data. Confusion matrix based methods are used to assess
the performance of the model. LR performed with low accuracy and the other two methods
performed with high accuracy. There is no evidence of diagnostic testing post modelling, there
may be an underlying issue with the data causing the LR method to perform relatively poorly.
Singh et al. [65] propose the use of SVM as a credit card fraud detection method. It is indicated
that the customer spending profile is the traditional measure for detecting fraudulent credit card
transactions; the use of SVM is suggested as an alternative to this. Singh et al. [65] suggest the
use of multiple kernels, including the linear, quadratic and RBF kernel. The confusion matrix
based performance metrics are used to measure the performance of each model. It is found that
the RBF kernel outperforms all other kernels.
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Oza [49] proposes the use of LR and SVM in credit card payment fraud detection. A data set
with labeled observations is used, dictating the use of supervised machine learning methods.
Oza [49] indicates the problem of false positives and the effect it has on the modelling process.
Proportional sampling is not used; however, weighted classes (fraudulent and non-fraudulent)
are applied in the classification process to overcome the imbalanced data problem. Confusion
matrix based performance measures are used in this research. A comparison is made between LR
and SVM and it is found that both methods perform with high levels of accuracy and minimal
false positives (high sensitivity rate). It is also stated that: "in a payments fraud detection
system, it is more critical to catch potential fraud transactions than to ensure all non-fraud
transactions are executed smoothly" [49].
Bhattacharyya et al. [7] assessed the feasibility of LR, SVM and RF for credit card fraud de-
tection. In this study real-life data is used as opposed to simulated data. The models aim to
classify a fraudulent credit card transaction out of many non-fraudulent transactions, the pri-
mary output variable is dichotomous. The concept of feature selection is explored in an attempt
to increase the performance of each model; however, detail regarding the selection methods used
is limited. Confusion matrix based performance metrics are considered for assessing the relative
performance of these models. The classification methods used show sufficient capability to be
used for fraud detection, despite the fact that the data is imbalanced.
Subudhi and Panigrahi [70] investigate the feasibility of using SVMs, in different forms, to
identify fraudulent call patterns in a telecommunications network. Anomalies are detected
when the current call pattern does not match the historical call pattern of a given user. A
real-world dataset is used when applying SVM where relative success is seen. Confusion matrix
based performance metrics are considered for assessing the relative performance of these models.
Subudhi and Panigrahi [70] believe that this method of anomaly detection can be extended to
other spheres as they were able to classify fraudulent instances with success.
Ravisankar et al. [60] suggest the use of ML for financial statement fraud detection. Tech-
niques considered are SVM, LR group method of data handling, genetic programming and two
derivative methods of neural networks. Feature selection is explored in the research and features
are selected based on their ranked t-statistic. Confusion matrix based performance metrics are
used. Probabilistic neural network performs the best when no feature selection is applied to
the data set; genetic programming and probabilistic neural network performed the best when
feature selection is applied. Ravisankar et al. [60] suggest that "feature selection is critical to
data mining".
Several authors ([7], [49], [1], [76], [30]) indicate the presence of unbalanced data in the case of
fraud. This is due to the large proportion of non-fraudulent cases compared to the relatively
small proportion of fraudulent cases. This means that when a sample is drawn from the pop-
ulation of fraudulent data, there is a small proportion of fraudulent observations compared to
an overwhelming number of non-fraudulent observations. It has been suggested that standard
machine learning algorithms will not perform well for imbalanced data sets since the algorithms
were built with the assumption of a balanced distribution [75]. Traditional classifiers that aim
to maximize the overall prediction accuracy tend to classify all data into the majority class [20].
Proportional sampling is suggested to overcome this problem. Itoo et al. [30] find that there
is a trade-off between sensitivity and specificity based on the sample proportion chosen. It is
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found that a high sensitivity may lead to a low specificity, this is due to a large number of non-
fraudulent cases being classified as fraudulent cases, leading to a high false positive rate. Random
under-sampling (or over-sampling) is another method which has been found to improvement in
the trade-off between sensitivity and specificity [75]. Several authors ([30], [75], [20]) suggest a
sample proportion that is not representative of the population class proportions. This research
will explore the use of proportional sampling to overcome the issue of unbalanced data.
There is a problem with the false positive rate of the models due to the unbalanced nature of
fraudulent data. The ability of a model to obtain a high fraud detection rate (true positive
rate) often comes at the expense of a high false positive rate. Both LR and SVM are capable of
dealing with this issue to a certain degree; however, the main objective is to identify fraudulent
cases, so sensitivity (true positive rate) is of critical importance. Oza [49] makes a comparison
between LR and SVM and it is found that both methods perform with "high levels of accuracy
and minimal false positives".
Peussa et al. [55] suggest the use of AIC and BIC as performance measures for their classification
model. This is postulated to be a traditional method of classification performance measurement.
James et al. [31] suggest that this method was initially used due to the limitations of computa-
tional power. Applying complicated models to large data sets with limited computation power
is not practical so proxy measures, such as AIC and BIC, were used. Since this is no longer
the case, and computing power allows classification models to be applied to ever larger data
sets, the use of confusion matrix performance metrics have become the predominant method for
classification performance measurement. Confusion matrix performance measures are used by
several authors ([30], [1], [65], [49], [7], [70], [60]).
There were some interesting choices of performance metrics in some of the articles, such as the
use of AIC and BIC by Peussa et al. [55]. Post modelling diagnostics were not mentioned and
it is unclear whether it was not done or simply not mentioned. Awoyemi et al. [1] found that
LR fit the data quite poorly; however, there was no post implementation diagnostic evidence to
support this.
In the majority of the above research there was no mention of feature selection. Whether this
means that it simply was not mentioned or not done is unclear. Bhattacharyya et al. [7] explore
feature selection to a certain extent, but Ravisankar et al. [60] suggest that "feature selection
is critical to data mining". Feature selection is explored in more detail in this research.
There is a large focus on binary classification methods, such as LR and SVM. This is due to the
ability of the model to classify dichotomous output variables successfully. Oza [49] compared
these classification methods directly and found that they perform relatively well in the credit
card fraud space. This research will focus on LR and SVM as classification methods and will be
explored in more detail in the following chapter.
Most of the research on fraud detection using ML methods came from the credit card fraud
detection space. This is not the same as the DO (or automated payment) space; however, many
of the principles, such as the four party payment model, are the same. It is logical to extend the
knowledge from the credit card fraud sphere to the DO fraud sphere. Subudhi and Panigrahi
[70] believe that this method of anomaly detection can be extended to other spheres.
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There are many important learnings from the related fraud research. There is a common issue
with unbalanced data which can be addressed by proportional sampling; however, there is a
trade-off between sensitivity and specificity depending on the sample proportion. Two very
applicable methods in the fraud classification sphere are LR and SVM, both of which were
discussed in greater detail earlier in the chapter and were commonly used by other researchers
in this field. The idea of feature selection was explored in the technical literature review, but
was seldomly used by other researchers. Confusion matrix performance metrics was discussed
earlier in the chapter and were used extensively by other researchers in the fraud detection field.
There was limited mention of pre- and post-diagnostic tests on models in the literature review;
however, this was discussed earlier in the chapter and will form part of the platform of reliability
in the results section.
All of the above mentioned topics will form part of the modelling process which will be discussed
in the methodology chapter which follows this chapter.
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In this chapter, the process used when applying LR and SVMs to the real world data is described.
First, data preparation is described, followed by a description of the conditions necessary for
applying LR and SVMs. The feature selection process is then described, followed by the method-
ology for applying LR and SVM. The final section to be discussed is model validation which
entails post application diagnostics and model performance measures.
4.1 Introduction
A single case study of one of the participating banks operating in the debit order environment
is performed. The overarching idea is to conduct a holistic case study in an attempt to model
the data to be able to identify fraudulent DOs using machine learning techniques, specifically
using LR and SVMs as classifiers.
In this chapter, a detailed description of the research methodology is given; however, the sum-
mary steps of the quantitative analysis and machine learning application are:
1. data (quality) preparation (process applicable to both LR and SVM):
(a) data preparation and extraction;
(b) multicollinearity assessment using VIF (using equation (3.8));
(c) conditions for LR;
43
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• step 1: multicollinear variables removed in step 1(b);
• step 2: sample size needs to be assessed (using equation (3.9));
• step 3: linearity of continuous independent variables is visually inspected;
(d) conditions for SVM with RBF kernel;
• step 1: normalisation to achieve unit variance and remove the effect of feature
scale (using equation (3.12));
• step 2: multicollinear variables removed in step 1(b);
(e) feature selection applied to the cleaned data set:
i. stepwise feature selection using p-value significance; the process is specified in
Chapter 3;
ii. PCA feature selection, beginning with the condition testing;
• step 1: KMO statistic used to determine sampling adequacy (using equation
(3.10));
• step 2: standardisation used to achieve multivariate normality, (using equa-
tion (3.12));
• step 3: the PCA feature selection process is then applied;
(f) splitting the data into test and training sets;
2. model application:
(a) apply the LR;
(b) apply the SVM with the RBF kernel;
3. model validation based on the below metrics (process applicable to both LR and SVM):
(a) ROC curves to obtain the AUC values;
(b) Hosmer-Lemeshow test for goodness-of-fit for LR (hypothesis test in Table 3.3);
(c) McFadden’s test for predictive power for LR;
(d) AIC measure for relative comparison of model fit (using equation (3.20));
(e) accuracy, sensitivity and specificity (consult Table 3.2 for equations); and
(f) calculation time.
The steps shown above will now be described in more detail beginning with the data preparation
phase.
4.2 Data Preparation
The purpose of the data preparation phase is to extract and transform the data for use in the
classification model. The focus is on preparing the data used by the model, so certain conditions
need to be met for the classification model to be valid.
The data used in the modelling process was gathered by a bank participating in the NPS.
Secondary data is defined as: "data gathered and recorded by someone else prior to the current
needs of the researcher" [77]. The DO data is secondary data and was obtained from a willing
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banking institution. Written permission was given by the institution and ethical clearance was
obtained from the university forum.
The DO data is given on a transaction level and has demographic information per transaction,
ultimately representing a portion of the automated payments that exist within South Africa.
Data collected during the year of 2019 is considered for analysis, and include several million
observations. A maximum limit of five million observations is used for the modelling component.
This limit is set due to the increasing computation time as the number of observations increase.
The full list of variables can be found in the Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: List of variables from DO data set..
Begin of Table 4.1
Number Variable Name Variable Definition Data Type
X1 Action Date Calendar date that the DO occurred on. Date
X2 Age Band Age of DO client. Ordinal
X3 Amount Value of debit order (per DO). Continuous
X4 App Activated DO clients who currently have an activated app. Binary




Value of withdrawals a DO client has made from an






Grouped value of withdrawals a DO client has made
from an ATM, DNR, External ATM or Spark ATM
during the month.
Ordinal
X8 Banking Client 1 if DO client qualifies as a banking client, 0 otherwise. Binary
X9 Branch Name Sign up branch name. Categorical
X10 Branch Visits 12
Month
A proxy of the number of times the DO client has
visited a branch in the past 12 months.
Ordinal
X11 Branch Visits 12
Month Grouped
A proxy of the number of times the DO client has
visited a branch in the past 12 months.
Ordinal
X12 Branch Visits 6
Month
A proxy of the number of times the DO client has
visited a branch in past 6 months.
Ordianl
X13 Branch Visits 6
Month Grouped
Grouped number of times the DO client has visited a




Business manager code. Categorical
X15 Bank Employee
Employee
Current-, past- and non-bank employee. Categorical
X16 Client Key DO client key. Categorical
X17 Credit Card
Client
1 if DO client has a credit card, 0 otherwise. Binary
X18 Current NLR
Score
The NLR (National Loans Register) score of the DO









Number of debit orders in the current month. Ordinal
X21 DO Current
Month Grouped
Grouped number of debit orders in the current month. Ordinal





1 if DO client is a fixed savings client, 0 otherwise. Binary
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Continuation of Table 4.1
Number Variable Name Variable Definition Data Type
X24 Flexible Savings
Client
1 if DO client is a flexible savings client, 0 otherwise. Binary
X25 Gender Code Gender of DO client. Binary
X26 Government Identifies a client who is employed by the government. Binary
X27 Grouping DO outcome (disputed, successful or insufficient funds). Categorical
X28 Inflow Current
Month
Total currency inflow into DO client account. Continuous
X29 Inflow Current
Month Grouped
Grouped total currency inflow into DO client account. Ordinal
X30 Month end Date Month of analysis. Date
X31 Most Frequent
Branch Key
Branch key which was visited most by DO client. Categorical
X32 Most Frequented
Branch Name
Branch name which was visited most by DO client. Categorical
X33 Most Recent
Visit Branch Key








Number of withdrawals a DO client has made from an







Grouped number of withdrawals a DO client has made





Official DO client definition. This is a sub-segmentation





Operations Manager code. Categorical
X39 POS Current
Month





The grouped value of pure POS (card swipes)
transactions.
Ordinal
X41 POS Value The value of pure POS (card swipes) transactions. Continuous
X42 POS Value
Grouped
Grouped value of pure POS (card swipes) transactions. Ordinal
X43 Province Province of the DO client’s most frequented branch. Categorical
X44 Quality Banking
Client





Grouping if DO client is either non-banking, banking or
quality banking client.
Categorical
X46 Quality Reverter DO Client reverts from a quality banking client to a
banking client.
Binary
X47 R45Flag 1 if DO value is R45, 0 otherwise. Binary
X48 R99Flag 1 if DO value is R99, 0 otherwise. Binary
X49 Reference System reference of DO (per DO). Categorical
X50 Reference Clean Abbreviated name of DO initiator. Categorical
X51 Regional
Manager
Regional manager code. Categorical
X52 Reverter DO Client reverts from a banking client to a
non-banking client.
Binary
X53 Risk Group NLR
Score
The NLR (National Loans Register) Score of the DO
client in the relevant month.
Ordinal
X54 Stable Inflows Currency inflow to accout for three or more months. Categorical
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Continuation of Table 4.1
Number Variable Name Variable Definition Data Type
X55 Stable Inflows
Code





Consistent product usage for 3 or more months. Categorical
X57 Stable Product
Usage Code




No arrears on loans. Binary
X59 Val Group Grouped value of DO. Ordinal
X60 USSD Registered Book view of total DO clients registered for USSD. Binary
X61 USSD User
Current Month










The number of debit orders deducted from the DO




0 if non-fraudulent DO, 1 if fraudulent and 0 if DO
status is unknown. Only DO status of 1 and 0 is
considered in this research.
Binary
End of Table 4.1
Table 4.1 gives the number of the variable in the first column. The variable name is given in
the second column, the variable definition is given in the third column and the fourth column
contains a description of the type of variable.
In Table 4.1, the only continuous variables are where the term Amount can be found in the
variable name, such as X6. The remaining variables are categorical or ordinal variables, including
binary variables.
The final variable Y is the output variable and represents whether the observation is fraudulent,
non-fraudulent or unknown. The modelling is focused on predicting this variable.
There is a mixture of financial indicators, demographic indicators and behavioural indicators.
The data used is real-life data and has not been simulated. It can be seen that there are derived
variables in the list which will be removed in subsequent steps of the methodology. Examples
of the derived metrics are variables X54 and X55, which are both indicators of account inflow
stability.
Several of the variables, such as X43 (Province), are non-ordinal categorical variables. These
variables will be transformed into dummy variables. In the case of variable X43 the "Head
Office" province classification will be made the reference category since the largest amount of
DO fraud exists in this province, "Head Office" is additional to the branches in the 9 provinces.
These dummy variables will be coded as new variables and the result of these alterations will
be shown in Chapter 5.
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4.2.1 Data Preparation and Extraction Steps
The data extraction from the server was performed using Transact-SQL and R [58]. The first
step is to change all text groupings into integer groupings as logistic regression requires integer
groupings. This step was done in the Transact-SQL phase. An example is when the variable
X26 (Government) has either a government or non-government status, this was converted to 1
for government status and 0 for non-government status. The code for this example can be seen
in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Code showing text to integer conversion.
The second step is to group the fraud status of the DOs. There are three groups of DOs present
in the data, they are broken into: DOs that are not fraudulent, DOs that are fraudulent and
DOs that have not been classified into either group. In Table 4.2, the proportion of each group
of the total sample are shown.




2 [Unknown] DOs originating from unknown
sources/businesses
n=1,366,463 27%





DOs originating from legitimate
sources/businesses
n=2,219,617 45%
Table 4.2: Table showning the overall DO grouping based on fraud status.
Referring to Table 4.2, the feature selection and model application will be done using the fraud-
ulent and non-fraudulent groups.
DOs with a binary response of Y=1 are fraudulent. The classification methodology described
in this chapter distinguishes the fraudulent DOs from the legitimate DOs. The model will be
trained and tested using this as the outcome variable.
A common issue with analysing fraud data is the fact that the proportion of fraudulent observa-
tions is usually substantially lower than the proportion of non-fraudulent observations. Itoo et
al. [30] propose the use of under-sampling the non-fraudulent cases in order to balance the data.
In this study, different proportions of fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations are extracted,
which are not necessarily representative of the actual proportions. If the proportion of fraudu-
lent to non-fraudulent is considered on a weekly basis for the full data set, see Figure 4.2, it is
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clear that the fraudulent observations constitute a smaller proportion of the total observations.
Referring to Figure 4.2, the proportions represented by fraudulent and non-fraudulent are ap-
proximately 50%-50% in week 1 of 2019 and moves closer to 25%-75% in the last few weeks of
2019. The decrease in fraudulent cases was as a result of efforts made by banks to curb the
effects of fraud in the DO system throughout 2019 (see Section 2.7 for more detail).
Figure 4.2: Proportion of fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations per week during 2019.
Due to the changing nature of the proportions of fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations, it is
necessary to analyse the data by selecting samples with different proportions. The proportions
of fraudulent to non-fraudulent observations to be considered are: 50%-50%, 80%-20% and
20%-80%. Refer to Figure 4.3 for a demonstration of how the proportions of fraudulent to
non-fraudulent observations are selected.
The selection of proportional fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations is part of the data
preparation step of the modelling procedure. This step is performed in the extraction phase of
the procedure as data is imported into the R environment.
The data preparation step is critical as an input to the modelling process so that the model uses
a cleaned and verified data set.
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Figure 4.3: Random under-sampling demonstration [30].
The summarised preparation and extraction steps are (see Section A.1.2 in the appendix):
1. prepare data for extraction from the SQL server;
• create numerical groupings for string character groupings;
• create binary variables as described in Table 4.2;
2. connect the SQL server to R;
3. import proportions of fraudulent to non-fraudulent randomly selected observations into R.
Once the data is extracted the transformation procedure is conducted. The following conditions
are part of the transformation procedure and are performed in the R environment.
4.2.2 Multicollinearity
Both LR and SVM require certain conditions to be met before these models can be applied.
Multicollinearity is the first condition to be discussed, which affects both LR and SVM.
The VIF threshold of 5, together with equation (3.8), were used since any value larger than 5 is
considered to be collinear and was removed [31].
The summarised steps of the process are shown below (see Section A.1.3 in the appendix):
1. import the necessary function to perform multicollinear analysis;
2. specify the VIF level to 5;
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3. run the function, the basic steps of the procedure are;
• produce a result on all features;
• remove the variable with the largest VIF;
• rerun the model using the decreased data set;
• this process is repeated until a result is produced where none of the variables have a
VIF above the threshold of 5.
4.2.3 Conditions for LR
The condition of sample size adequacy needs to be met, using equation (3.9). The number of
actual observations in the data set ideally needs to be larger than this minimum. The outcome
of the equation is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
The condition of linearity of continuous input (X) variables needs to be inspected. Inspection is
done by transforming the output (Y) variable using the logit function, equation (3.7), and then
comparing the relationship of each continuous input (X) variable with the logit of the output
(Y) variable. The relationship should be approximately linear.
4.2.4 Conditions for SVM
The final condition for SVM is that of normalised data which is achieved through a transforma-
tion once multicollinearity removed. This is to remove the influence of scale in variables on the
model and is achieved by applying equation (3.12) to the data.
4.2.5 Training and Test Set Split
After the above conditions are met the data is then split into two subsets: the test set and the
training set.
The size of the training and test set is specified as a percentage. Itoo et al. [30] make use of a
training to testing data set split of 70%-30%. In this research an 80%-20% training to testing
data split is used. For example, if the sample has n = 500, 000 observations, the training set
will consist of 400,000 observations (80% of the sample) and the test set will consist of 100,000
observations (20% of the sample).
Figure 4.4 shows the final division of the data set. The population (Database) is arbitrarily set
at 5,000,000 fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations. From the 5,000,000 observations in the
population (Database) fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations are randomly selected at the
proportions shown in Figure 4.4. The final table is combined and from this table the training
and test sets are selected.
Referring to Figure 4.4, the sample proportions are labelled as:
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Figure 4.4: Division of data set.
• A - 80% fraudulent and 20% non-fraudulent observations;
• B - 50% fraudulent and 50% non-fraudulent observations; and
• C - 20% fraudulent and 80% non-fraudulent observations.
For the sake of simplicity, the sample proportions will be referred to as sample proportions A,B
and C.
The test set will ultimately be used as the source of data for the data validation component of
the analysis. However, before this is done feature selection is applied to both test and training
sets to reduce the number of features in the data.
4.2.6 Feature Selection
More features included in the model does not guarantee a better model fit. Some variables may
not be related to the output variable and will lead to deterioration of the fit of the model [31].
For this reason feature selection is performed, to remove the variables that are not related to
the output variable. A positive outcome of the feature selection process is the decrease in input
variables which requires less computation power for modelling.
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The first feature selection method to be applied is the stepwise algorithm. This is done once
all transformations are completed and conditions are met for both classification methods. The
process discussed in Chapter 3 is used to perform stepwise feature selection.
Before PCA feature selection is done the training data is standardised according to equa-
tion (3.12) and sampling adequacy is tested using the KMO statistic, see equation (3.10). Once
the data is standardised and the sample is adequate (KMO > 0.7) the PCA feature selection is
applied.
A summary of the feature selection process is described below (see Sections A.1.6 and A.1.8 in
the appendix):
1. the necessary function is loaded into R;
2. the training data is fed into the function;
3. both stepwise and PCA feature selection methods are applied according to the steps dis-
cussed in Chapter 3;
4. only the features selected as per the training data set are used when applying the classifi-
cation models.
At this point the feature selection process is complete and the classification models can be
applied.
4.3 Modelling Application
The model application phase of the machine learning process is described below. An overview
of the process can be found in Figure 3.1.
At this point of the modelling process the data is prepared and the necessary conditions are met
and the LR and SVM models can be applied.
The above mentioned classification models are chosen since they are strong linear classifiers and
are commonly used in fraud detection situations, refer to Section 3.4. The RBF kernel will be
used in the SVM models and the kernel can be either a linear or non-linear classifier which
allows for model versatility [28].
The basic steps for the model application process are (see Sections A.1.4, A.1.7 and A.1.9 in the
appendix):
1. import the necessary functions;
2. set the parameters in the function, this includes assigning the necessary training data set;
3. run the classification function;
4. a trained classification model is produced;
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5. the test data is fed into the trained classification model;
6. several results are produced from fitting the model to the test set.
The above steps are applied to the training data set and the classification model is trained/cre-
ated. The training data is 80% of the total data set, leaving 20% for the testing component
of the data set. The test data is fed into the model after which the model predicts the binary
output of the test set. The performance of the model is measured by comparing actual values
to predicted values of the test set.
The results produced by the classification model on the test set are analysed in the next com-
ponent.
4.4 Modelling Validation
The model validation component is centered around the classification accuracy of each permu-
tation of feature selection method and classification method. Several permutations are assessed
combining all feature selection methods with all classification methods.
The six permutations, per sample proportion, are:
1. no feature selection (all features with acceptable VIF scores are included) with logistic
regression;
2. stepwise feature selection with logistic regression;
3. PCA feature selection with logistic regression;
4. no feature selection (all features with acceptable VIF scores are included) with SVM with
an RBF kernel;
5. stepwise feature selection with SVM with an RBF kernel;
6. PCA feature selection with SVM with an RBF kernel.
With each permutation, a result is created which will be compared using the same set of measures
(see Section A.1.5 in the appendix). The specific classification metrics are accuracy, sensitivity,
specificity and the F1-measure. The equations for these metrics can be found in Table 3.2.
The ROC curve is used to analyse the goodness of fit for all permutations mentioned above. A
good classification model will hug the left and top boundaries with as large an AUC as possible.
This means that a large percentage of observations were classified correctly and consequently
that the classification error rates are low, refer to Figure 3.4.
In conjunction with the ROC curve, the goodness-of-fit for the logistic regression permutations
are assessed by the Hosmer-Lemeshow test (using hypothesis test (3.3)) and the McFadden’s
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Pseudo R2 is applied for predictive capability. The tests are performed on all permutations of
the logistic regression models. Refer to Chapter 3 for additional details on these diagnostic tests.
In addition to the above-mentioned diagnostic tests, AIC (using equation (3.20)) is used to
assess the relative performance of the model permutations. The lower the AIC the better the
performance of the model. The AIC is used as a relative performance measure for each model
permutation.
Another method, used in conjunction with the above-mentioned measures, is to measure the
calculation time of each of the models. Some models are mathematically more complex and this
results in higher computation times. The larger a data set grows the higher the computation
time becomes as well. For this reason the computation time will also be included in the results
and used for comparison of the models.
This chapter describes the process the data goes through from the source system to where it
is modelled. The process begins with data preparation, followed by data condition assessment.
Feature selection is then applied to the data after which the models are applied. The final step
in the ML process is to validate the model, which is done using classification accuracy metrics
and post application diagnostics.
The next chapter will show the results produced by applying the above process to the DO data
set.
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The aim of this research was to investigate the success of LR and SVM in identifying fraudulent
debit orders in the NPS. The results in this chapter were produced using the methodology
specified in the previous chapter.
The results obtained from applying LR are presented in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, the results
from applying SVM are presented. Finally, in Section 5.3, the results obtained by the two
methods are compared.
5.1 Logistic Regression
The first set of results discussed are the conditions that need to be met prior to the application
of LR, followed by the performance and diagnostics checks.
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
The sample size used for testing is n=500,000 consisting of 63 independent (X) variables and 1
dependent (Y) variable (see Table 4.1 for more details). All observations are randomly selected
57
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from the population of 5,000,000 observations generated during 2019. The training and test set
sizes (as per the 80%-20% split) are 400,000 and 100,000 respectively. The list of independent
variables shrinks once collinear variables are removed as shown later in the research and the
final list of variables considered is shown in Table 5.2.
There are several non-ordinal categorical variables that need to be transformed into dummy
variables. Province is an example of this. The total fraudulent cases per province are ranked
from most to least fraudulent cases, refer to Table 5.1. The province with the highest number of
fraudulent cases is identified as the reference province and the remaining provinces are encoded as
dummy variables. In this case it is "Head Office", this is due to the fact that many fraudulent
cases are proactively identified at the head office. For example, when the fraudulent DO is
identified in Limpopo the dummy variable for Limpopo will be classified as 1, and the dummy
variable for Limpopo will be classified as 0 for all observations in the other nine provinces.
There are several independent variables for which this process was followed including: Official
Client Type, Quality Banking Client Description, Title and Stable Product Usage. Due to the
sensitive nature of these variables, volumes of fraudulent DOs will not be shown. The remaining
variables from Table 5.2 are either continuous, binary or categorical (ordinal) values and did not
need to be transformed.
Province Code Fraudulent Cases
Head Office 882,625
Province Gauteng 149,134
Province Kwa-Zulu Natal 76,739
Province Western Cape 71,354
Province Eastern Cape 64,976
Province Mpumalanga 49,772
Province Limpopo 35,362
Province North West 35,289
Province Free State 27,037
Province Northern Cape 21,632
Table 5.1: Total fraudulent cases per province.
5.1.2 Conditions
All conditions specified in the methodology (Chapter 4) were assessed, including multicollinear-
ity, variable linearity, sample size adequacy and variable standardisation.
Multicollinearity
Using equation (3.8) on the full sample (n=500,000), the first condition that is assessed is the
removal of multicollinearity. Multiple derived variables were present in the DO data which
caused multicollinearity. These variables were removed. The initial list of variables, using a
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VIF threshold of 5, is decreased to 31, excluding the dependent variable. The VIF values of the
variables can be seen in Table 5.2. The largest VIF value is for Ave Inflows 6 Month Grouped
with a value of 3.83.
The independent variables that remain after multicollinearity checks are used in all of the re-
maining processes. This means that the variables identified in Table 5.2 are used by all LR and
SVM models.
Table 5.2: Remaining variables and VIF scores.
Begin of Table 5.2




Banking Client New 1.03
Employee 1.05
Credit Card Client 1.44
Fixed Savings Client 1.02
Flexible Savings Client 1.11
Gov 1.23
Grouping DebiCheck Branch Dispute 1.00
Inflow Current Month Grouped 3.43
Official Client Type Fee 3.17
Official Client Type New 1.01
Province Eastern Cape 1.20
Province Free State 1.08
Province Gauteng 1.37
Province Kwa-Zulu Natal 1.20
Province Limpopo 1.10
Province Mpumalanga 1.12
Province North West 1.12
Province Northern Cape 1.06





Risk Group NLR Compuscore 1.17








Ave Inflows 6 Month Grouped 3.83
Branch Visits 12 Month Grouped 1.33
POS Current Month Grouped 1.54
POS Value Grouped 1.06
Ave DO 6 Month 2.54
DO Current Month Grouped 2.20
Num ATM Withdrawals Current Month Grouped 2.11
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Continuation of Table 5.2
Variable Name VIF Score
ATM Withdrawal Amount Grouped 2.26
Quality Banking Client 2.25
Stable Product Usage Stable 1.26
Stable Product Usage Unstable 1.33
End of Table 5.2
Variable linearity
The next condition to be considered is variable linearity. Referring to Table 5.2, the independent
variables that remain after multicollinear variables are removed show that there are no contin-
uous variables remaining. All variables are either binary or ordinal categorical; therefore, it is
not necessary to visually inspect the logit relationship. Since the visual inspection of linearity
is not necessary for the remaining variables it is possible to move onto the next condition.
Sample size adequacy
The final condition to consider for logistic regression is sample size adequacy. In the case of LR,
this condition is assessed using equation (3.9):
n = 100 + 50k = 100 + 50(31) = 1, 650. (5.1)
The sample size used for testing is 500,000 which is split into a training set (n=400,000) and a
test set (n=100,000); therefore, the sample size is adequate to apply LR.
The above conditions are met and the data set can be used for the feature selection component
of the modelling process.
Standardisation and sampling adequacy conditions for PCA
Having assessed all necessary conditions for application of LR to the data, the conditions for
application of PCA needs to be considered.
The first condition that needs to be assessed is sampling adequacy for application of PCA.
Sampling adequacy is assessed using the KMO test. A value of 0.7 or above, is desirable for the
KMO test [21]. Performing the test on the sample size of 500,000 the overall metric achieved
is 0.81. This overall KMO value is well above the minimum value of 0.6 and above the 0.7
minimum required for this research. Table 5.3 shows the KMO statistic for all variables. Only
variables with individual KMO scores greater than 0.7 were considered. There was a significant
drop in the number of variables when compared to the number of variables listed in Table 5.2.
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Variable KMO Value
Overall KMO Score 0.81
Age band 0.73
Banking Client 0.77
Credit Card Client 0.88
Flexible Savings Client 0.87
Gov 0.87
Inflow Current Month Grouped 0.84
Reverter 0.71
Ave Inflows 6 Month Grouped 0.84
Branch Visits 12 Month Grouped 0.85
POS Current Month Grouped 0.78
Ave DO 6 Month 0.78
DO Current Month Grouped 0.77
Quality Banking Client 0.81
Table 5.3: KMO statistic for the remaining independent variables.
The final condition that needs to be met for application of PCA is the standardisation of vari-
ables, since PCA is affected by the scale of the input variables. The standardisation of input
variables is done by applying equation (3.12) to each variable. This is done in the preparation
phase, before PCA is applied.
PCA and stepwise feature selection is then applied to the cleaned data.
5.1.3 Model Performance
All conditions were met as presented above. LR could therefore be applied to the selected data
set. The R code used to apply both models can be found in Appendix A. The necessary metrics
to assess the performance of each LR model are discussed.
The general performance comparison considers the information contained in Table 5.4. The
three models, per sample proportion A to C, as shown in Table 5.4, are:
• LR with no feature selection (all features with acceptable VIF scores are included);
• LR with stepwise feature selection; and
• LR with PCA feature selection.
AIC
The AIC gives an indication of the simplicity of a model. The smaller this value the better the
fit of the model and the simpler the model is.
1These values are less than the lower limit for the McFadden pseudo R2
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83.48% 91,540 2.20E-16 0.2385
A Stepwise feature
selection
83.45% 91,390 2.20E-16 0.2394
A PCA feature
selection
79.89% 116,419 2.20E-16 0.0301 1
B No feature
selection
72.77% 420,700 2.20E-16 0.2414
B Stepwise feature
selection
72.85% 86,730 2.20E-16 0.2480
B PCA feature
selection
59.48% 161,227 2.20E-16 0.0310 1
C No feature
selection
82.78% 93,640 2.20E-16 0.2205
C Stepwise feature
selection
82.84% 94,120 2.20E-16 0.2161
C PCA feature
selection
79.99% 116,989 2.20E-16 0.0261 1
Table 5.4: Logistic regression summary table.
The AIC values vary substantially for the LR models. The largest AIC value is for the sample
proportion B with no feature selection model with AIC=420,700. The smallest AIC is for the
sample proportion B with stepwise feature selection model with AIC=86,730.
Hosmer-Lemeshow test
Hosmer-Lemeshow tests the goodness-of-fit of the model. The test shows how well the model
fits the data. Looking at the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistical significance, it is clear that there are
issues with the data when used for LR modelling.
Referring to Table 5.4 the p-value produced by each model is below 0.05, and using the Hosmer-
Lemeshow hypothesis test (3.3) from Chapter 3, the H0 hypothesis should be rejected; therefore,
sufficient evidence exists to suggest that the model does not fit the data. This result is expected
as the sample size exceeds the suggested maximum sample size of n = 25,000 and this test is
actually not a reflection on the fit.
The above-mentioned Hosmer-Lemeshow result does not provide any additional information
about the goodness-of-fit. The following information gained from the Hosmer-Lemeshow test
provides additional insight.
It is interesting to note the behaviour of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test regardless of all the models
having sample sizes greater than n=25,000. Referring to Figures 5.1 to 5.3, these graphs show
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Figure 5.1: The observed and expected percentage cases per group for the fraudulent cases, generated
when applying the Hosmer-Lemeshow test (sample proportion A with stepwise feature selection).
Figure 5.2: The observed and expected percentage cases per group for the fraudulent cases, generated
when applying the Hosmer-Lemeshow test (sample proportion B with stepwise feature selection).
the percentage of total observations classified into 11 approximately equal sized groups. These
groups are in ascending order of the predicted probability that a case is fraudulent, given that
the actual outcome is fraudulent, or the probability that Ŷ = 1, given that Y = 1. The actual
percentage of observations is compared to the expected percentage of observations showing how
well the model fits the data.
Figure 5.1 shows the results for sample proportion A, sampled to contain 80% fraudulent cases.
In this case, the cut-off probability for identifying fraudulent cases is encompassed in the first
interval. Therefore, only between 0% and 5% non-fraudulent cases and therefore more than 95%
fraudulent cases with P (Ŷ = 1) > 0.5, are identified. The sensitivity of this application, defined
as the probability that the predicted outcome is fraudulent, given that the actual outcome is
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Figure 5.3: The observed and expected percentage cases per group for the fraudulent cases, generated
when applying the Hosmer-Lemeshow test (sample proportion C with stepwise feature selection).
fraudulent, is 97.64% (see Table 5.5). The expected and observed frequencies are approximately
the same.
Figure 5.2 shows the results for sample proportion B, sampled to contain 50% fraudulent cases.
The boundaries of the 11 intervals are of approximately equal size, and the cut-off probability
for identifying fraudulent cases is encompassed in the sixth interval. Approximately 70% of the
observations were identified as fraudulent. The sensitivity, as in Table 5.5, is 72.86%. Observed
and expected frequencies are approximately the same.
Figure 5.3 shows the results for sample proportion C, sampled to contain 20% fraudulent cases.
The largest percentage of observations fall into the eleventh group. The eleventh group has
boundaries that encompass the cut-off probability of 0.5 used for this research, if P (Ŷ = 1) > 0.5,
then the case is flagged as fraudulent. Between 30% and 35% of the observations in the eleventh
group have a probability of at least 0.41 of being fraudulent, and are actual fraudulent cases.
The sensitivity of the test is calculated using the cut-off probability of 0.5, and the calculated
value (see Table 5.5) is 27.85%. The expected and observed percentages are approximately the
same.
Figures 5.1 to 5.3 show the large effect that sample proportion can have on sensitivity and the
model fit in general. Sample proportion A and C appear to be extreme. Sample proportion B
(50%-50%) is producing moderate results that are not so extreme.
McFadden’s Pseudo Coefficient of Determination
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 test assesses the predictive capability of the model. The test gives an
indication of how well the independent variables can predict the dependent variable. Using
the McFadden’s Pseudo R2 test from Section 3.2.4, it is clear that all models, except the PCA
feature selection models, have high predictive power since the diagnostic values fall between
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0.2 and 0.4 [39]. This means that PCA LR models do not have high predictive capability (see
Table 5.4).
The diagnostic measures above show that no feature selection and stepwise feature selection
models have high predictive capability and that all of the models have sample sizes that are too
large to use Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic to determine goodness-of-fit.











83.48% 97.76% 26.39% 62.08% 6.81
A Stepwise feature
selection
83.45% 97.64% 26.69% 62.17% 2.17
A PCA feature
selection
79.89% 99.99% 00.01% 50.00% 0.72
B No feature
selection
72.77% 72.58% 72.93% 72.77% 23.46
B Stepwise feature
selection
72.85% 72.86% 72.84% 72.85% 0.45
B PCA feature
selection
59.48% 65.11% 53.78% 59.44% 0.82
C No feature
selection
82.78% 27.71% 96.65% 62.18% 6.47
C Stepwise feature
selection
82.84% 27.85% 96.68% 62.26% 2.17
C PCA feature
selection
79.99% 00.01% 99.99% 50.00% 0.74
Table 5.5: Summary of the performance measures of the LR models.
Consulting Table 3.2 for equations, the metrics considered for specific model performance are:
accuracy, sensitivity, specificity, F1-measure and run time. The value for each metric is sum-
marised in Table 5.5.
Accuracy
Accuracy gives an indication of how many observations were predicted correctly compared to
all predictions. This is a good metric to assess general model performance.
The highest performing models used sample proportion A and the lowest performing models used
sample proportion B. The best model is the no feature selection model using sample proportion
A with 83.48% accuracy. The PCA feature selection method for each model yields the lowest
accuracy per sample proportion and will not be considered as a viable solution due to the other
high performing models. The KMO values caused a large drop in the number of input (X)
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variables resulting in a loss of information for the PCA models. See Table 5.3 for the KMO
values for variables included in the PCA feature selection method.
Sensitivity and Specificity
Sensitivity represents the number of correctly predicted true positive values out of all positive
values. With regards to fraudulent DOs that is: the number of correctly identified fraudulent
DO cases out of all fraudulent cases.
From the point of view of fraud detection, sensitivity is a critically important metric. The ability
to correctly identify fraudulent DOs with high certainty gives a lot of confidence in the ability
of the model to serve its purpose of identifying fraud. The sensitivity of the models with sample
proportion A are the highest, reaching close to 100%. The lowest sensitivities are produced
where sample proportion C is used.
The specificity of the model shows how accurately the model is able to identify negative cases, in
the case of DOs that is how accurately the model is able to identify non-fraudulent cases. This
is not a cause for major concern since the purpose of the model is to focus around predicting
fraud and not predicting non-fraud. There are models that have specificity close to 100% and
other models where the specificity is closer to 20%.
It is interesting to note the sensitivity and specificity rates alternate between sample proportions
A and C. That is when a model produces high sensitivity rates and low specificity rates for sample
proportion A, it gives low sensitivity rates and high specificity rates for sample proportion
C. This indicates that, for both sensitivity and specificity to be relatively high, the chosen
sample proportion lies somewhere between sample proportion A and sample proportion C. The
modeller should decide on the trade-offs between high sensitivity (sample proportion A), or a
lower sensitivity, but an acceptable specificity (sample proportion B).
Run time
The run time metric considers the calculation time for training the LR model. This metric
scales with the number of observations and independent variables used in the model and is a
very important consideration in the real-world application of classification.
The longest run times was achieved when no feature selection was applied, with significant drop-
offs in run time for the stepwise and PCA feature selection models. This drop-off is due to fewer
independent variables being included in the model. Although there are large differences in run
time for LR models, this metric will be used primarily to compare LR and SVM.
ROC
Table 5.5 summarises some of the most important model performance metrics. The graph
in Figure 5.4, shows the ROC curve for the highest performing model using stepwise feature
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Figure 5.4: Logistic regression stepwise ROC (sample proportion A with stepwise feature selection).
The graph in Figure 5.4, shows the different sensitivity and specificity combinations at different
thresholds of posterior probability. The curve should ideally hug the top and left boundaries as
close as possible. This increases the area under the curve, which is indicative of higher prediction
accuracy. The ROC curve is well above the 45◦ line with an AUC of 78.50%. The light blue
area is the confidence interval for the ROC curve. This can be considered a high performing
result and will be used in the comparison to the SVM models.
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Independent variable interpretation
The odds ratios for all sample proportions with stepwise feature selection LR models are shown
in Tables 5.6 to 5.8.
Variable Odds Ratio Significance
Age band 1.0631 <0.0001
Banking Client 0.9008 0.0054
Banking Client New 0.9342 0.3889
Employee 0.5909 0.0002
Fixed Savings Client 0.9207 0.0136
Inflow Current Month Grouped 1.0404 0.0007
Official Client Type New 0.309 0.0298
Province Eastern Cape 0.8349 <0.0001
Province Limpopo 0.7757 <0.0001
Province Northern Cape 1.1267 0.0663
R45Flag 69.2835 <0.0001
R99Flag 36.2350 <0.0001
Risk Group NLR Compuscore 1.1389 <0.0001
Title MS 0.9241 0.0007
Title PROF 1.1246 0.9945
Val group 0.7294 <0.0001
Ave Inflows 6 Month Grouped 1.1485 <0.0001
Branch Visits 12 Month Grouped 0.9373 <0.0001
POS Current Month Grouped 1.0591 <0.0001
Ave DO 6 Month 0.9347 <0.0001
Num ATM Withdrawals Current Month Grouped 0.966 <0.0001
Quality Banking Client 0.8342 <0.0001
Table 5.6: Variable odds ratio and significance (sample proportion A with stepwise feature selection).
Referring to Table 5.6, the odds ratios for Banking Client New, Province Northern Cape and
Title PROF are not significant. The remaining variables have significant odds ratios.
Referring to Table 5.6, the odds ratio of R99Flag is 36.2350. An odds ratio of 36.2350 for
R99Flag means that the odds of a fraudulent transaction is 36.2350 more if R99Flag = 1 than
when R99Flag = 0 (the reference). The value is significant because the p-value for the R99Flag
coefficient is less than 0,05. This ties in with the "R99 scam" identified in Section 2.7.
If the Age band increases by 1 unit, the odds of the DO being fraudulent increases by 1.05,
showing a positive relationship between age and the likelihood of being exposed to fraud. These
R99Flag and Age band variables tie in with the example of the "R99 scam" given in Section 2.7,
and it also shows that elderly persons are more exposed to these scams.
Referring to Table 5.6, the odds ratio for the Employee variable is 0.5909. The odds of a DO
being classified as fraudulent (DO Classification = 1) is decreased by a factor of 0.5909. If a
person is an employee of the bank.
Referring to Table 5.6, odds ratios of above 1 are considered risk factors. Age band has an odds
ratio of 1.0631 and is significant, which means that the older an individual is the more likely it
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Variable Odds Ratio Significance
Age band 1.055 <0.0001
Banking Client 0.9136 0.0195
Banking Client New 1.2907 0.0011
Employee 0.5005 <0.0001
Fixed Savings Client 0.9689 0.3370
Inflow Current Month Grouped 1.0594 <0.0001
Official Client Type New 0.329 0.0362
Province Eastern Cape 0.8746 0.0002
Province Limpopo 0.818 <0.0001
Province Northern Cape 1.1773 0.0101
R45Flag 53.0182 <0.0001
R99Flag 31.6643 <0.0001
Risk Group NLR Compuscore 1.117 <0.0001
Title MS 0.958 0.0631
Title PROF 25.6118 0.0065
Val group 0.7189 <0.0001
Ave Inflows 6 Month Grouped 1.1645 <0.0001
Branch Visits 12 Month Grouped 0.9367 <0.0001
POS Current Month Grouped 1.0434 <0.0001
Ave DO 6 Month 0.9388 <0.0001
Num ATM Withdrawals Current Month Grouped 0.9636 <0.0001
Quality Banking Client 0.8351 <0.0001
Table 5.7: Variable odds ratio and significance (sample proportion B with stepwise feature selection).
Variable Odds Ratio Significance
Age band 1.0361 <0.0001
Banking Client 0.9459 0.1619
Banking Client New 1.0042 0.9565
Employee 0.5713 <0.0001
Fixed Savings Client 1.0531 0.1134
Inflow Current Month Grouped 1.0586 <0.0001
Official Client Type New 0.564 0.2043
Province Eastern Cape 0.8791 <0.0001
Province Limpopo 0.9151 0.0574
Province Northern Cape 1.1204 0.0631
R45Flag 70.4372 <0.0001
R99Flag 29.6274 <0.0001
Risk Group NLR Compuscore 1.1308 <0.0001
Title MS 0.9125 <0.0001
Title PROF 0.1322 0.0164
Val group 0.7239 <0.0001
Ave Inflows 6 Month Grouped 1.1437 <0.0001
Branch Visits 12 Month Grouped 0.9357 <0.0001
POS Current Month Grouped 1.0527 <0.0001
Ave DO 6 Month 0.9428 <0.0001
Num ATM Withdrawals Current Month Grouped 0.9799 0.0015
Quality Banking Client 0.8388 <0.0001
Table 5.8: Variable odds ratio and significance (sample proportion C with stepwise feature selection).
is that they will fall victim to DO fraud. Odds ratios below 1 are considered to be protective
factors. Val group indicates the value of a DO. The odds ratio for Val group is 0.7294 and is
significant, which means the higher the value of a DO is, the less likely it is to be fraudulent. This
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makes intuitive sense since fraud on large DOs will attract more attention to it and remaining
unnoticed is a priority for DO fraud.
When comparing the odds ratios for the different sample proportions, refer to Tables 5.6 to 5.8,
there are small differences. In general, the odds ratios remain either risk factors or protective
factors and remain either significant or insignificant across the sample proportions. There are a
few exceptions like Banking Client New which switches between significant and not significant.
Title PROF switches between significance and changes from a risk factor to protective factor.
This could be due to few observations where Title PROF has a value of 1.
The above section analysed the LR results, the following section will analyse the SVM results.
5.2 Support Vector Machine
The first component of this section includes conditions that need to be met in order to apply
SVM, followed by the summary of the performance measures.
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
The SVM models were produced using a smaller sample of n=50,000 observations. This is due
to the increased calculation time of each model. The variables shown in Table 5.2 are considered
for the SVM modelling component. Using the 80%-20% training-to-test set split the subsets
are n=40,000 for the training set and n=10,000 for the test set. All observations are randomly
selected from the population of 5,000,000 observations which were recorded during 2019.
5.2.2 Conditions
There are two conditions that need to be met for SVM to be applied. One is the removal of
collinear variables and the transformation (or standardisation) of the data. The same conditions
for PCA need to be met before the feature selection method is applied.
Multicollinearity and standardisation
The same VIF method used in the LR results component is applied here. The same VIF
threshold of 5 is used producing the same list of 31 input variables as seen in Table 5.2. These
31 variables are used for all the models to follow.
The input variables are standardised to remove the influence of scale. This is done by applying
equation (3.12) once the multicollinearity is removed.
The above two conditions are met for SVM application. Feature selection is subsequently per-
formed, before the SVM is applied.
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Standardisation and sample size conditions for PCA
Having assessed all necessary conditions for application of SVM, the conditions for application
of PCA feature selection are considered.
The two conditions that need to be met for application of PCA is sampling adequacy and the
removal of scale from features. The same procedure is followed as with LR and further detail
can be found in the LR section. The overall KMO statistic of 0.81 is achieved, this is sufficient
to proceed with the model application. The remaining KMO values for individual variables
can be found in Table 5.3. The second condition of data normalisation is achieved by applying
equation (3.12), this is already done during the SVM condition process.
Since the above conditions are met the models are applied and the performance metrics are
analysed.
5.2.3 Model Performance
The following section considers the classification performance metrics. A combination of all
metrics are summarised in Table 5.9, which include confusion matrix deduced measures. Refer
to Table 3.2 for the equations of accuracy, sensitivity, specificity and the F1-measure.
The three models, per sample proportion (sample proportion A to C), being considered in
Table 5.9 are:
• SVM with no feature selection (all features with acceptable VIF scores are included);
• SVM with stepwise feature selection;
• SVM with PCA feature selection.
Accuracy, sensitivity and specificity
The highest accuracy produced by the SVM models is 85.22% where stepwise feature selection is
done and sample proportion A was used. The lowest accuracy produced using sample proportion
B with PCA feature selection at 57.99% accuracy.
When considering sensitivity the SVM classifier achieves a high score of nearly 100% in some
models. The sensitivity of the sample proportion A models is very high whereas the sensitivity
of the sample proportion C models is very low. The sample proportion B models sit close to
75% for the no feature selection and the stepwise feature selection models.
Some of the SVM classifier models achieve specificity scores of nearly 100%. The opposite of
sensitivity rates is true for specificity. The specificity of the sample proportion A models is
very low whereas the specificity of the sample proportion C models is very high. The sample
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84.37% 99.65% 20.71% 60.18% 628
A Stepwise feature
selection
85.22% 98.12% 31.51% 64.81% 295
A PCA feature
selection
80.80% 99.99% 00.01% 50.53% 789
B No feature
selection
75.71% 75.40% 76.03% 75.71% 534
B Stepwise feature
selection
73.36% 72.21% 74.53% 73.37% 471
B PCA feature
selection
57.99% 52.79% 63.32% 58.15% 479
C No feature
selection
82.59% 25.32% 97.39% 61.36% 532
C Stepwise feature
selection
82.08% 22.59% 97.46% 60.02% 347
C PCA feature
selection
79.53% 00.03% 99.99% 50.19% 910
Table 5.9: SVM summary table.
proportion B models sit close to 75% for the no feature selection and the stepwise feature
selection models.
ROC
The ROC for the highest performing SVM model is given in Figure 5.5. The AUC of this model
is 88.2% with the ROC curve hugging the upper boundary more than the left boundary. This
is indicative of the high level of sensitivity of the model. This ROC was produced using sample
proportion A. Looking at Table 5.9 it is clear that these models produced very high sensitivity
rates with low specificity rates.
Having looked at both LR and SVM classification results in isolation, it is necessary to consider
these classification methods relative to one another.
5.3 Comparison Analysis
This section of the results compares LR and SVM classification methods directly. Figure 5.6 to
5.9, shows the accuracy, sensitivity, specificity and run time for the two classification methods
relative to one another. Each feature selection method, that is no feature selection, stepwise
feature selection and PCA feature selection, are also compared for both classification methods.
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Figure 5.5: SVM no feature selection ROC (sample proportion A).
For each feature selection method and classification method there is also a sample proportion
consideration which will be analysed.
5.3.1 Accuracy
Referring to Figure 5.6, there are some key observations to make regarding accuracy. For both
LR and SVM the sample proportion that produces the highest accuracy is sample proportion
A, followed by sample proportion C and then sample proportion B.
The models with sample proportion A produce approximately equivalent results for both classi-
fiers. The highest accuracy that a single model produced was achieved using sample proportion
A with an SVM model with no feature selection producing an accuracy of 85%.
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Figure 5.6: Accuracy summary per classifier, sample proportion and feature selection method.
Across all sample proportions, models and feature selection methods the lowest accuracy is
produced by models where PCA feature selection is applied. In general, the accuracy rates
produced by no feature selection and stepwise feature selection are approximately the same,
indicating a limited positive impact by implementing feature selection.
5.3.2 Sensitivity and Specificity
Referring to Figure 5.7 for sensitivity comparison. Sample proportion A produces the highest
sensitivity, followed by sample proportion B and then sample proportion C.
The sample proportion A SVM models produce a sensitivity just below 100%. This means that
these models flag fraud correctly every time. This does come at a cost of very low specificity,
producing large amounts of false positives (or false alarms). This is a problem experienced by
other researchers, refer to Section 3.4.
Referring to Figure 5.8 for specificity comparison. The highest specificity rates were achieved
using sample proportion C. These rates are just below 100%.
Take note of the specificity for the sample proportion A groups for both classification methods.
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Figure 5.7: Sensitivity summary per classifier, sample proportion and feature selection method.
These specificity rates are very low at around 25%. This means that the sample proportion A
has a high rate of true positive identification and a high rate of false positive identification. This
produces a large degree of false positives as the model is over classifying.
For the sample proportion C models the reverse of the above is true. These models have
high specificity and low sensitivity. This means the models are very capable of identifying non-
fraudulent cases and will not readily classify a non-fraudulent case as fraudulent, but the models
also struggle to identify fraudulent cases. These models are under classifying.
For accuracy, sensitivity and specificity there is minimal difference between LR and SVM. This
is the same conclusion reached by Oza [49], who used the same classification methods to identify
credit card fraud. There is a significant impact produced by the sample proportion used, there
was a lot of focus placed on this problem by other researchers, refer to Section 3.4. Feature
selection had a very small influence on the confusion matrix performance metrics; however, this
may not be the case in the run time results.
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Figure 5.8: Specificity summary per classifier, sample proportion and feature selection method.
5.3.3 Run Time
Figure 5.9 shows the run time comparison. On average the SVM models run much longer than
the LR models. This is due to the complexity of the SVM models and the more complicated
mathematics result in longer calculation times.
The longest running models are the SVM models that use no feature selection. This is due to
the increasing number of variables causing additional calculation time. The feature selection
makes minimal impact on the accuracy, sensitivity and specificity of each model, but results in
better run times.
From a practical point of view there is limited scope for application of SVM where data sets are
very large due to the large calculation times. In fact, one of the strengths of SVM models is the
high accuracy rates on small data sets, refer to Chapter 3 for further discussion on this. When
the data sets become larger LR becomes more applicable due to the shorter calculation times.
The results section first considered that all conditions were met for all feature selection and
classification methods. The conditions were met to a satisfactory level which means the feature
selection and classification methods could be applied. The feature selection methods decreased
the number of input variables from the initial list. After this the classification methods were
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Figure 5.9: Run time summary per classifier, sample proportion and feature selection method.
applied to the prepared data, followed by analysis of the performance metrics and diagnostics
of either model.
Various models performed with good results, with the sensitivity of some models reaching just
below 100%. The accuracy levels of some of the models were at 85%, which is very high in
a practical, real-life situation. The post application diagnostics showed that the sample size
(n=500,000) was too large for the Hosmer-Lemeshow test, causing the test to fail. However,
considering the high performance metrics and the fact that the models achieved favourable
results in the McFadden’s Pseudo R2 hypothesis test means that a single diagnostic test is
inferior to multiple diagnostic tests used in conjunction with one another.
The major classification performance findings were that the sample proportion plays a significant
role in the accuracy, sensitivity and specificity; however, it can be seen that feature selection
has a limited impact on the classification accuracy of these models on this data set. The feature
selection method does have a large impact on the run time of each model. The larger the data
set the longer the model runs for, which is why feature selection should be used when the model
runs for an extended duration.
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This chapter considers the overall discussion of all the findings in the literature review chapter
and the results chapter. A summary of the study is then given followed by a comparison between
the goals of the study and the results achieved. The contributions made by the study are then
stated followed by some possible future areas of research. Recommendations are then discussed
after which the ultimate conclusion is stated.
6.1 Discussion
The main discussion points are: the impact of model complexity, the importance of sensitivity
in fraud, model conditions and diagnostics, the problem of unbalanced data and the effect of
feature selection on model performance.
6.1.1 Model Complexity
SVM is computationally more complex than LR. This means that training the model takes
longer when using an SVM model even when the training sample was ten times smaller than
the LR sample. This is made apparent in Figure 5.9 where the SVM models run several times
longer than the LR models. The data used to train these models is not the full population and
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running the SVM on the full population would be highly impractical. This raises the question:
"How applicable is SVM to this data set?".
A major strength of SVMs is its ability to perform well with very small data sets. The DO data
set is not specifically large; however, it is already too large for SVM models to be trained within
a reasonable time span. Considering the run time results for LR it is much more practical to
use a simple model like LR with this data set. The run time results for LR are much lower
than that of SVM. With approximately the same accuracy, specificity and sensitivity for both
models, but a much lower run time for LR, it is clear that LR is more applicable to this data
set. When comparing LR and SVM, Kuhn et al. [38] find there is no performance loss by using
a more straightforward model. The same result is reached in this research. The next discussion
point is the importance of sensitivity.
6.1.2 The Importance of Sensitivity
According to Peussa et al. [55], in the case of credit default, sensitivity is more important than
specificity or accuracy. This is the case for fraud detection as well. The results in Figures 5.6 to
5.8 show that high levels of sensitivity can be achieved by altering the number of fraudulent cases
in the sample. There were models that produced sensitivity rates just below 100%; however,
this is at the cost of very low specificity rates for the same models.
High sensitivity rates are very desirable when fraud is considered, even at the cost of low speci-
ficity rates. There is a point where the specificity rate becomes too low and the false positive
rate becomes so high that the cost to investigate all the false positives begins to out-weigh the
gains from preventing the fraud, this is the probable scenario when 100% sensitivity is achieved.
Sampling proportions are very important to the sensitivity and specificity relationship as it
dictates the behaviour of the two measures.
The ratio of sensitivity and specificity needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis to achieve
the result that is required for a specific situation. The break-even point for a bank for this
trade-off is different to a telecommunications company. To say either specificity or sensitivity
is superior without sufficient motivation would imply a misleading result. The next discussion
points are the conditions and diagnostics.
6.1.3 Model Conditions and Diagnostics
The LR models all rejected the Hosmer-Lemeshow hypothesis test indicating that there was an
underlying issue with the data. This was not the case though, since the sample size was too large
to apply the Hosmer-Lemeshow hypothesis test. Most models achieved satisfactory McFadden’s
Pseudo R2 values, indicating that the models had high predictive power. Looking at Table 5.4,
it is clear that the LR models produced relatively accurate results. The above three points show
that it is important to meet specific modelling conditions before applying any classifier to a data
set and to perform diagnostics post-application.
Awoyemi et al. [1] considers LR and SVM in fraud detection and finds that LR performs at
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a lower accuracy than SVM. The results found in this research, using the DO data, indicate
that LR and SVM are approximately equivalent. This is supported by the findings of Oza
[49], who concludes that both models perform with high accuracy. Awoyemi et al. [1] do not
indicate whether condition testing was done before models were applied. It is also not indicated
whether diagnostic tests were conducted after the models were applied. There may have been
an underlying data issues which were not noticed.
The above discussion demonstrates the importance of diagnostic tests. They are not necessarily
conclusive as they all have shortcomings, but to exclude any condition or diagnostics tests would
be unwise. Without condition and diagnostic tests it becomes possible to undermine a result,
even if the result is correct. The next discussion point is the problem of unbalanced data.
6.1.4 The Problem of Unbalanced Data
Unbalanced data is an issue that is prevalent within the fraud environment, refer to Section 3.4.
Itoo et al. [30] suggested the use of under-sampling to overcome this issue. The same issue was
present here and sample proportions chosen to assess its impact were: 50%-50%, 80%-20% and
20%-80% of fraudulent to non-fraudulent observations.
The performance results varied dramatically depending on the sample proportion chosen. The
80%-20% sample proportion produces the highest accuracy for both LR and SVM and the
highest sensitivity for both classification methods as well. This came at the cost of very low
specificity rates. The 20%-80% sample proportion produces slightly lower accuracy results with
the highest specificity rates. This was at the cost of low sensitivity rates and is not a desirable
result when fraud classification is considered.
Sample proportion B produces the lowest accuracy rates, but has more balanced sensitivity and
specificity rates. The models produced by this sample proportion is the most balanced overall
and depending on the situation is highly desirable. The last component to be considered in the
Discussion section is the effect of feature selection.
6.1.5 The Effect of Feature Selection
When looking at the feature selection on all models there is very little difference in performance
between stepwise feature selection and no feature selection. The only notable difference in
performance is where run time is considered where stepwise feature selection models would
produce a lower run time than no feature selection models. This result means that the models
do not necessarily need feature selection to produce accurate results, but on larger data sets
results will be produced faster. This is an important point when real world application of these
models is concerned.
Ravisankar et al. [60] suggest that feature selection is critical to data mining. This is true in
situations where large data sets are concerned and where the run time has a financial impact on
a business.
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
82 Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusions
The above sections explore the major discussion points relative to the literature and the findings
in Chapter 5. It is found that LR is more applicable to this setting than SVM. The greater rela-
tive importance of sensitivity to specificity and accuracy is demonstrated. It is determined that
model condition and diagnostic testing is of critical importance. Unbalanced data is discussed,
showing that different sampling proportions can produce vastly different model performance re-
sults. It is also shown, with this data set, that feature selection makes little difference to model
performance, but makes a large difference to model run time. The next section will consider the
conclusions based on the above discussion.
6.2 Conclusions
The final section of this study gives a summary of the study along with the goals achieved, fol-
lowed by contributions and suggestions of future research. Recommendations are given followed
by the final component which is the study conclusion.
6.2.1 Study Overview
In summary, with R74million worth of fraudulent DOs per month, the need for fraud detection
is clear. The weakness was identified as the placement of the mandate with the collector (seller)
as opposed to the banks. The appropriate ML models, (LR and SVM) for this type of fraud,
were selected based on the conditions of the data and other research relevant to fraud. The ML
models were then applied to the case study data.
Efforts by banks to reduce fraudulent DOs are seen in the decreasing proportion of fraud per
week, shown in Figure 4.2. These efforts are also seen when variables such as R99Flag are
present in the data to assist with the ease of identification. The A/C debit order system is an
attempt from the NPS to curb the shortcomings in the four party payment system. The ML
fraud detection method complements the above mentioned efforts in the fight against automated
payment fraud.
It was found that feature selection had a small impact on the performance of models; however, it
was evident that the sample proportions selected had a major impact on the model performance.
This was an exercise of fraud identification where sensitivity is the most important. For this
reason the 80%-20% fraudulent to non-fraudulent sample proportion is the most applicable to
this situation as the highest sensitivity rates were produced. This may not be the case for all
data sets and environments as the cost to investigate false positives may be higher than the
actual cost of fraud prevented. The sample proportion and associated sensitivity and specificity
rates need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Condition testing and post model application diagnostics were applied in this research. It was
evident PCA feature selection was inferior to stepwise feature selection in this case due to
diagnostic failures and relatively poor performance results. The relatively poor performance of
the PCA feature selection models is due to a loss of information when variables are removed for
having KMO values below 0.7.
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When considering the odds ratios for LR, there were several variables that were protective factors
and others that were risk factors. These factors either increased or decreased the odds of a case
being fraudulent. It was found that when a DO belonged to an older person it was more likely
to be fraudulent than when the DO belonged to a younger person. It was also found that if a
DO had a value of R99 then the odds of the case being fraudulent would increase several fold.
This ties in with the "R99 scam" that was identified in Section 2.7.
LR models produced equivalent results to the more complex SVM models with a much better
run time. From a practical point of view, this means that LR should perform better on larger
data sets. Only one year worth of data is considered in this study, it would not be practical to
apply SVM models to the population data set. For this reason LR is the better classifier for this
situation.
Considering the above summary it can be concluded that ML techniques can be used to classify
fraudulent DOs with high levels of accuracy.
6.2.2 Objectives Achieved
The objectives specified in Section 1.3 are listed in Table 6.1 with status of whether it was
achieved or not.
Section Design Objective Status
Literature Review Describe the components of the payment system, interoper-
ability and the four party model
Achieved
Literature Review Define debit orders and the different types of payments sys-
tems
Achieved
Literature Review Describe debit order disputes and abuse Achieved
Literature Review Describe fraud in the DO environment Achieved
Literature Review Identify applicable models to identify fraud Achieved
Case Study Describe conditions for ML model application Achieved
Case Study Apply ML models to the case study data Achieved
Case Study Define and apply model diagnostics and performance mea-
surement so that the results are valid and reliable
Achieved
Table 6.1: List of objectives achieved.
As can be seen in Table 6.1 all of the objectives laid out at the beginning of the research
were achieved. The main research question, specified in Section 1.2, can therefore be restated
and answered: "Can fraudulent DOs be identified using the machine learning process, LR and
SVMs?". Yes, it can be concluded that ML techniques can be used to identify fraudulent DOs.
The expectation of valid and reliable results was created in Section 1.6. The predicted error in
the Hosmer-Lemeshow graphs (see Figures 5.1 to 5.3) is compared against the predicted error
rate produced by the testing data set (see Table 5.5) and is found to produce similar error rates,
indicating a reliable result. The condition testing, model diagnostics and similar predicted error
rates means the results produced are valid and reliable.
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6.2.3 Contribution
This is the first time DO fraud has been investigated using ML in South Africa. There is a
large amount of credit card fraud research (globally), but this type of automated payment fraud
has not yet been researched in South Africa. This research sheds light on an area of study that
has not yet been analysed. The critical testing of results is not always present in research and
is present in this study. Since conclusions are reached with rigorous condition and diagnostic
testing, the methodology discussed in this study can be applied to other studies in fraud. The
final contribution is an ML model that can be applied in the banking industry. This model
can be applied directly at participating banks, where it can begin identifying fraudulent DOs.
This means banks are able to: save money for their clients, add additional intelligent financial
technology to their business and increase the quality of their reputation due to less DO fraud.
These are significant contributions in both the academic sphere and in the financial technology
market.
6.2.4 Future Research
There are several areas where future research can be conducted. The kernel used in this study
was the RBF kernel; however, there are many other kernels that could be considered. The use
of other kernels on the same data set could produce higher performance results and is a topic
that could be researched in future. Feature selection had a minor impact on the performance of
models; however, there are other feature selection methods that could be used to see if there is a
further run time gain and if there is a larger gain in model performance. The sample proportions
chosen in this research is not an exhaustive list of proportion combinations. A future study can
be conducted to find the optimal balance between fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations
to produce the highest model performance without the large costs in sensitivity and specificity.
Since the cut-off point for LR was fixed at 0.5 for the duration of the study, the optimal cut-off
point for LR models can also be explored. Only LR and SVM were considered in this study;
however, there are many other classification methods that could be explored with the possibility
of producing even better performance results. This study considers only fraudulent DOs and
there are many studies on credit card fraud detection; however, these methods can be applied
in any fraud detection environment such as identity fraud. This is an area where major research
can still be conducted.
6.2.5 Recommendations
There is a clear need for intervention where fraud is concerned; however, traditional methods
of fraud detection are falling short due to the rapidly changing nature of both fraud and the
financial technology market. It is recommended that alternative methods of fraud detection
methods are explored. The use of ML is the obvious recommendation due to its ability to
interpret ever growing stockpiles of data. The use of computers to sift through the data by
means of an algorithm is the logical next step for any enterprise to increase security of their
systems. It is to recommend to use ML to identify fraud where ever there is a need for fraud
detection.
When it comes to using a ML model to identify fraud, it is recommended that sample propor-
tions of non-fraudulent to fraudulent observations are considered and that feature selection is
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used when the data set is large. It is further recommended to use LR when the data set is large
and SVM when the number of features is large. In spite of all of the above recommendations it
is proposed that the correct algorithm is used for the data set along with the correct feature se-
lection method. Certain models fit certain data sets better than other models and this flexibility
is a necessity to achieve the best possible results.
In conclusion, there will always be loopholes in banking systems and there will always be a
group of individuals willing to find and exploit these loopholes [64]. The ML approach of
fraud identification offers a longer term approach to combat the advances of fraudsters. The
consequences of reducing fraud are felt by many individuals in South Africa and has a positive
effect on the NPS; therefore, every effort must be made to eradicate the "rogue elements" in the
system. Once the current fraud is removed, the NPS must be made more secure. The question
then becomes: "what will the new fraud look like?".
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All R code used in the production of results in Chapter 5.
A.1 LR Code:
A.1.1 Loading packages
The necessary packages are loaded using the below commands.
l i b r a r y ( car )
l i b r a r y ( p ly r )
l i b r a r y (RODBC)
l i b r a r y ( odbc )
l i b r a r y ( ISLR)
l i b r a r y ( ca r e t )
l i b r a r y ( e1071 )
l i b r a r y (MASS)
l i b r a r y (ROCR)
l i b r a r y (pROC)
l i b r a r y ( ResourceSe l e c t i on )
l i b r a r y ( t i dyv e r s e )
l i b r a r y (broom)
l i b r a r y ( DescTools )
l i b r a r y ( genera lhos lem )
l i b r a r y ( psych )
l i b r a r y ( dplyr )
A.1.2 Data extraction from server
The data is extracted from SQL using the below commands.
con <− RODBC: : odbcDriverConnect ( ’ Dr iver=SQL Server Native C l i en t 1 1 . 0 ;
SERVER=;
DATABASE=SDB_BI;
trusted_connect ion=yes ; ’ )
xvii
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#−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
#Balanced (50−50)
SQL_Query <− sqlQuery ( con , " ( s e l e c t top 250000 ∗
from sdb_bi . dbo . HT_DO_Extract_grouped
where Group_Class i f i ca t ion in ( 1 ) )
union a l l
( s e l e c t top 250000 ∗
from sdb_bi . dbo . HT_DO_Extract_grouped
where Group_Class i f i ca t ion in ( 2 ) ) " )
#Balanced (80−20)
SQL_Query <− sqlQuery ( con , " ( s e l e c t top 400000 ∗
from sdb_bi . dbo . HT_DO_Extract_grouped
where Group_Class i f i ca t ion in ( 1 ) )
union a l l
( s e l e c t top 100000 ∗
from sdb_bi . dbo . HT_DO_Extract_grouped
where Group_Class i f i ca t ion in ( 2 ) ) " )
#Balanced (20−80)
SQL_Query <− sqlQuery ( con , " ( s e l e c t top 100000 ∗
from sdb_bi . dbo . HT_DO_Extract_grouped
where Group_Class i f i ca t ion in ( 1 ) )
union a l l
( s e l e c t top 400000 ∗
from sdb_bi . dbo . HT_DO_Extract_grouped
where Group_Class i f i ca t ion in ( 2 ) ) " )
SQL_Query_backup <− SQL_Query
l i b r a r y ( dplyr )

























































, DO_c la s s i f i ca t i on
)
#===========================================================================
A.1.3 Multicollinearity removal in R
Multicollinearity is removed using the below commands.
mydata <− ca tegor i ca l_data
dim(mydata )
mydata$DO_class i f icat ion = as . numeric ( mydata$DO_class i f icat ion )
f i t=lm( DO_cla s s i f i ca t i on ~ . , data=mydata )
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v i f ( f i t )
th r e sho ld=5
drop=TRUE
a f t e r v i f=data . frame ( )
whi l e ( drop==TRUE) {
v f i t=v i f ( f i t )
a f t e r v i f=rbind . f i l l ( a f t e r v i f , as . data . frame ( t ( v f i t ) ) )
i f (max( v f i t )>thre sho ld ) { f i t=
update ( f i t , as . formula ( paste (" ." ,"~" ," ." ," −" , names ( which .max( v f i t ) ) ) ) ) }
e l s e { drop=FALSE }}
t_a f t e r v i f= as . data . frame ( t ( a f t e r v i f ) )
vf i t_d= as . data . frame ( v f i t )
p r i n t ( vf i t_d )
data_base<−SQL_Query [ , c ( names ( v f i t ) , " DO_c la s s i f i ca t i on " ) ]
#===========================================================================
data<−data_base
smp_size <− f l o o r ( 0 . 8 ∗ nrow ( data ) )
s e t . seed (123)
tra in_ind <− sample ( seq_len ( nrow ( data ) ) , s i z e = smp_size )
t r a i n <− data [ train_ind , ]
t e s t <− data [− train_ind , ]
ptm <− proc . time ( )
A.1.4 Model application in R (no feature selection)
The logistic regression model is applied to the data set after multicollinearity is removed using
the below commands.
glm . f i t <− glm ( DO_cla s s i f i ca t i on ~ . , data = t r a i n
, fami ly=binomial ( l i n k=" l o g i t " ) )
Run_time<−proc . time ( ) − ptm
glm . f i t
l i b r a r y ( ca r e t )
pdata <− p r ed i c t ( glm . f i t , newdata = tes t , type = " response ")
data = as . numeric ( pdata >0.5)
A.1.5 Performance measure calculations in R
The following commands are used to produce the model performance measures.
confus ionMatr ix ( f a c t o r ( data ) , f a c t o r ( t e s t $DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ) )
p r i n t ( ’Run Time : ’ )
Run_time
hoslem . t e s t ( ( data ) , ( t e s t $DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ) , g=10)
PseudoR2 ( glm . f i t )
pROC_obj <− roc ( data , t e s t$DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ,
smoothed = TRUE,
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c i=TRUE, c i . alpha =0.7 , s t r a t i f i e d=FALSE,
p l o t=TRUE, auc . polygon=TRUE, max . auc . polygon=TRUE, g r id=TRUE,
p r in t . auc=TRUE, show . th r e s=TRUE)
sens . c i <− c i . se (pROC_obj)
p l o t ( sens . c i , type="shape " , c o l=" l i g h t b l u e " , main = ’LOG’ )
p l o t ( sens . c i , type="bars ")
#===========================================================================
A.1.6 Stepwise feature selection in R
Stepwise feature selection is performed using the below commands.
data<−data_base
smp_size <− f l o o r ( 0 . 8 ∗ nrow ( data ) )
s e t . seed (123)
tra in_ind <− sample ( seq_len ( nrow ( data ) ) , s i z e = smp_size )
t r a i n <− data [ train_ind , ]
t e s t <− data [− train_ind , ]
glm . f i t <− glm ( DO_cla s s i f i ca t i on ~ . , data = tra in , f ami ly = binomial )





smp_size <− f l o o r ( 0 . 8 ∗ nrow ( data ) )
s e t . seed (123)
tra in_ind <− sample ( seq_len ( nrow ( data ) ) , s i z e = smp_size )
t r a i n <− data [ train_ind , ]
t e s t <− data [− train_ind , ]
ptm <− proc . time ( )
A.1.7 Model application in R (stepwise feature selection)
The logistic regression model is applied to the data set after stepwise feature selection is per-
formed using the below commands.
glm . f i t . s t ep <− glm ( StepWise$formula , data = t r a i n
, fami ly=binomial ( l i n k=" l o g i t " ) )
Run_time<−proc . time ( ) − ptm
summary( glm . f i t . s t ep )
#===========================================================================
glm . f i t . s t ep
l i b r a r y ( ca r e t )
pdata <− p r ed i c t ( glm . f i t . step , newdata = tes t , type = " response ")
data = as . numeric ( pdata >0.5)
confus ionMatr ix ( f a c t o r ( data ) , f a c t o r ( t e s t $DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ) )
p r i n t ( ’Run Time : ’ )
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Run_time
hoslem . t e s t ( t ra in$DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on , glm . f i t . s t e p $ f i t t e d . va lue s , g=11)
PseudoR2 ( glm . f i t . s t ep )
pROC_obj <− roc ( data , t e s t$DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ,
smoothed = TRUE,
c i=TRUE, c i . alpha =0.7 , s t r a t i f i e d=FALSE,
p l o t=TRUE, auc . polygon=TRUE, max . auc . polygon=TRUE, g r id=TRUE,
p r in t . auc=TRUE, show . th r e s=TRUE)
sens . c i <− c i . se (pROC_obj)
p l o t ( sens . c i , type="shape " , c o l=" l i g h t b l u e " , main = ’ Step LOG’ )
p l o t ( sens . c i , type="bars ")
#===========================================================================
A.1.8 PCA feature selection in R
PCA feature selection is performed using the below commands.
data<−data . frame ( data_base )
KMO_test <− KMO( data )
KMO_test
#======================================================














," DO_c la s s i f i ca t i on " ) ]
smp_size <− f l o o r ( 0 . 8 ∗ nrow ( data ) )
s e t . seed (123)
tra in_ind <− sample ( seq_len ( nrow ( data ) ) , s i z e = smp_size )
t r a i n <− data [ train_ind , ]
t e s t <− data [− train_ind , ]
t r a in_sca l e <− s c a l e ( t r a i n [ , c ( "Age_band"
," Banking_Client"
," Credit_Card_Client"













t e s t_sca l e <− s c a l e ( t e s t [ , c ( "Age_band"
," Banking_Client"
," Credit_Card_Client"









," Quality_Banking_Client" ) ] )
#======================================================
training_set_pca <− princomp ( s c a l e ( t r a in_sca l e [ , c ("Age_band"
," Banking_Client"
," Credit_Card_Client"










) ] ) )
summary( tra ining_set_pca )
training_set_pca_data<−data . frame ( t ra in ing_set_pca$score s )
tra in ing_set_pca_data$DO_class i f i cat ion =
un l i s t ( data . frame ( t r a in$DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ) )
training_set_pca_data<−cbind ( training_set_pca_data [ , 1 : 1 4 ]
, DO_c la s s i f i ca t i on=t ra in$DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on )
ptm <− proc . time ( )
A.1.9 Model application in R (PCA feature selection)
The logistic regression model is applied to the data set after PCA feature selection is performed
using the below commands.
pca . f i t = glm ( formula = DO_cla s s i f i c a t i on ~. ,
f ami ly=binomial ( l i n k=" l o g i t " ) ,
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data = data . frame ( training_set_pca_data ) )
Run_time<−proc . time ( ) − ptm
test_set_pca <− princomp ( s c a l e ( t e s t_sca l e [ , c ( "Age_band"
," Banking_Client"
," Credit_Card_Client"









," Quality_Banking_Client " ) ] ) )
test_set_pca_data<−data . frame ( tes t_set_pca$scores )
test_set_pca_data$DO_class i f icat ion = un l i s t ( t e s t $DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on )
prob_pred_pca = pr ed i c t ( pca . f i t
, newdata = test_set_pca_data [ , 1 : 1 3 ] , type = ’ response ’ )
y_pred = i f e l s e ( prob_pred_pca > 0 . 5 , 1 , 0)
#======================================================
summary( pca . f i t )
l i b r a r y ( ca r e t )
confus ionMatr ix ( f a c t o r ( y_pred ) , f a c t o r ( t e s t $DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ) )
p r i n t ( ’Run Time : ’ )
Run_time
hoslem . t e s t ( tra in ing_set_pca_data$DO_class i f i cat ion
, pca . f i t $ f i t t e d . va lue s , g=11)
PseudoR2 ( pca . f i t )
pROC_obj <− roc ( y_pred , t e s t$DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ,
smoothed = TRUE,
c i=TRUE, c i . alpha =0.7 , s t r a t i f i e d=FALSE,
p l o t=TRUE, auc . polygon=TRUE, max . auc . polygon=TRUE, g r id=TRUE,
p r in t . auc=TRUE, show . th r e s=TRUE)
sens . c i <− c i . se (pROC_obj)
p l o t ( sens . c i , type="shape " , c o l=" l i g h t b l u e " , main = ’LOG’ )
p l o t ( sens . c i , type="bars ")
A.2 SVM Code:
The SVM code follows a similar layout an process as the LR code.
l i b r a r y ( car )
l i b r a r y ( p ly r )
l i b r a r y ( ’RODBC’ )
l i b r a r y ( ’ odbc ’ )
l i b r a r y ( ISLR)
l i b r a r y ( ’ caret ’ )
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l i b r a r y ( e1071 )
l i b r a r y (MASS)
l i b r a r y (ROCR)
l i b r a r y (pROC)
con <− RODBC: : odbcDriverConnect ( ’ Dr iver=SQL Server Native C l i en t 1 1 . 0 ;
SERVER=;
DATABASE=SDB_BI;
trusted_connect ion=yes ; ’ )
#−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
#Balanced (50−50)
SQL_Query <− sqlQuery ( con , " ( s e l e c t top 25000 ∗
from sdb_bi . dbo . HT_DO_Extract_grouped
where Group_Class i f i ca t ion in ( 1 ) )
union a l l
( s e l e c t top 25000 ∗
from sdb_bi . dbo . HT_DO_Extract_grouped
where Group_Class i f i ca t ion in ( 2 ) ) " )
#Balanced (80−20)
SQL_Query <− sqlQuery ( con , " ( s e l e c t top 40000 ∗
from sdb_bi . dbo . HT_DO_Extract_grouped
where Group_Class i f i ca t ion in ( 1 ) )
union a l l
( s e l e c t top 10000 ∗
from sdb_bi . dbo . HT_DO_Extract_grouped
where Group_Class i f i ca t ion in ( 2 ) ) " )
#Balanced (20−80)
SQL_Query <− sqlQuery ( con , " ( s e l e c t top 10000 ∗
from sdb_bi . dbo . HT_DO_Extract_grouped
where Group_Class i f i ca t ion in ( 1 ) )
union a l l
( s e l e c t top 40000 ∗
from sdb_bi . dbo . HT_DO_Extract_grouped
where Group_Class i f i ca t ion in ( 2 ) ) " )
l i b r a r y ( dplyr )

























































, DO_c la s s i f i ca t i on )
data_base<−s c a l e ( ca tegor i ca l_data )
#===========================================================================
mydata <− s c a l e ( ca tegor i ca l_data )
dim(mydata )
mydata$DO_class i f icat ion = as . numeric ( mydata$DO_class i f icat ion )
f i t=lm( DO_cla s s i f i ca t i on ~ . , data=mydata )
v i f ( f i t )
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th r e sho ld=5
drop=TRUE
a f t e r v i f=data . frame ( )
whi l e ( drop==TRUE) {
v f i t=v i f ( f i t )
a f t e r v i f=rbind . f i l l ( a f t e r v i f , as . data . frame ( t ( v f i t ) ) )
i f (max( v f i t )>thre sho ld ) { f i t=
update ( f i t , as . formula ( paste (" ." ,"~" ," ." ," −" , names ( which .max( v f i t ) ) ) ) ) }
e l s e { drop=FALSE }}
t_a f t e r v i f= as . data . frame ( t ( a f t e r v i f ) )
vf i t_d= as . data . frame ( v f i t )
data_base<−SQL_Query [ , c ( names ( v f i t ) , " DO_c la s s i f i ca t i on " ) ]
#===========================================================================
data<−data_base
smp_size <− f l o o r ( 0 . 8 ∗ nrow ( data ) )
s e t . seed (123)
tra in_ind <− sample ( seq_len ( nrow ( data ) ) , s i z e = smp_size )
t r a i n <− data [ train_ind , ]
t e s t <− data [− train_ind , ]
ptm <− proc . time ( )
svm . f i t = svm( formula = DO_cla s s i f i ca t i on ~ . ,
data = tra in ,
type = ’C−c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ’ ,
k e rne l = ’ r ad i a l ’ )
Run_time<−proc . time ( ) − ptm
summray(svm . f i t )
l i b r a r y ( ca r e t )
pdata <− p r ed i c t (svm . f i t , newdata = tes t , type = " response ")
confus ionMatr ix ( f a c t o r ( pdata ) , f a c t o r ( t e s t $DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ) )
p r i n t ( ’Run Time : ’ )
Run_time
pROC_obj <− roc ( pdata , t e s t $DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ,
smoothed = TRUE,
c i=TRUE, c i . alpha =0.9 , s t r a t i f i e d=FALSE,
p l o t=TRUE, auc . polygon=TRUE, max . auc . polygon=TRUE, g r id=TRUE,
p r in t . auc=TRUE, show . th r e s=TRUE)
sens . c i <− c i . se (pROC_obj)
p l o t ( sens . c i , type="shape " , c o l=" l i g h t b l u e ")
p l o t ( sens . c i , type="bars ")
#===========================================================================
data<−data_base
smp_size <− f l o o r ( 0 . 8 ∗ nrow ( data ) )
s e t . seed (123)
tra in_ind <− sample ( seq_len ( nrow ( data ) ) , s i z e = smp_size )
t r a i n <− data [ train_ind , ]
t e s t <− data [− train_ind , ]
glm . f i t <− glm ( DO_cla s s i f i ca t i on ~ . , data = tra in , f ami ly = binomial )




xxviii Appendix A. R Code
#===========================================================================
data<−data_base
smp_size <− f l o o r ( 0 . 8 ∗ nrow ( data ) )
s e t . seed (123)
tra in_ind <− sample ( seq_len ( nrow ( data ) ) , s i z e = smp_size )
t r a i n <− data [ train_ind , ]
t e s t <− data [− train_ind , ]
ptm <− proc . time ( )
svm . f i t = svm( formula = StepWise$formula ,
data = tra in ,
type = ’C−c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ’ ,
k e rne l = ’ r ad i a l ’ )
Run_time<−proc . time ( ) − ptm
svm . f i t
l i b r a r y ( ca r e t )
pdata <− p r ed i c t (svm . f i t , newdata = tes t , type = " response ")
confus ionMatr ix ( f a c t o r ( pdata ) , f a c t o r ( t e s t $DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ) )
p r i n t ( ’Run Time : ’ )
Run_time
pROC_obj <− roc ( pdata , t e s t $DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ,
smoothed = TRUE,
c i=TRUE, c i . alpha =0.8 , s t r a t i f i e d=FALSE,
p l o t=TRUE, auc . polygon=TRUE, max . auc . polygon=TRUE, g r id=TRUE,
p r in t . auc=TRUE, show . th r e s=TRUE)
sens . c i <− c i . se (pROC_obj)
p l o t ( sens . c i , type="shape " , c o l=" l i g h t b l u e " , main = ’ Step SVM’ )
p l o t ( sens . c i , type="bars ")
#===========================================================================
data<−data . frame ( data_base )
KMO_test <− KMO( data )
KMO_test
#======================================================
data<−data_base [ c ( "Age_band"
," Banking_Client"
," Credit_Card_Client"










," DO_c la s s i f i ca t i on " ) ]
smp_size <− f l o o r ( 0 . 8 ∗ nrow ( data ) )
s e t . seed (123)
tra in_ind <− sample ( seq_len ( nrow ( data ) ) , s i z e = smp_size )
t r a i n <− data [ train_ind , ]
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t e s t <− data [− train_ind , ]
t r a in_sca l e <− t r a i n [ , c ( "Age_band"
," Banking_Client"
," Credit_Card_Client"











t e s t_sca l e <− t e s t [ , c ( "Age_band"
," Banking_Client"
," Credit_Card_Client"












training_set_pca <− princomp ( t r a in_sca l e [ , c ( "Age_band"
," Banking_Client"
," Credit_Card_Client"











summary( tra ining_set_pca )
training_set_pca_data<−data . frame ( t ra in ing_set_pca$score s )
tra in ing_set_pca_data$DO_class i f i cat ion =
un l i s t ( data . frame ( t r a in$DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ) )
training_set_pca_data<−cbind ( training_set_pca_data [ , 1 : 1 3 ]
, DO_c la s s i f i ca t i on=t ra in$DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on )
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xxx Appendix A. R Code
ptm <− proc . time ( )
pca . f i t <− svm( formula = DO_cla s s i f i ca t i on ~. ,
data = data . frame ( training_set_pca_data ) ,
type = ’C−c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ’ ,
k e rne l = ’ r ad i a l ’
) )
Run_time<−proc . time ( ) − ptm
summary( pca . f i t )
test_set_pca <− princomp ( t e s t_s ca l e [ , c ( "Age_band"
," Banking_Client"
," Credit_Card_Client"











test_set_pca_data<−data . frame ( tes t_set_pca$scores )
test_set_pca_data$DO_class i f icat ion = un l i s t ( t e s t $DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on )
prob_pred_pca = pr ed i c t ( pca . f i t
, newdata = test_set_pca_data [ , 1 : 1 3 ]
, type = ’ response ’ )
#======================================================
l i b r a r y ( ca r e t )
confus ionMatr ix ( prob_pred_pca , f a c t o r ( t e s t $DO_c l a s s i f i c a t i on ) )
p r i n t ( ’Run Time : ’ )
Run_time
pROC_obj <− roc ( prob_pred_pca , t e s t$DO_c la s s i f i c a t i on ,
smoothed = TRUE,
c i=TRUE, c i . alpha =0.7 , s t r a t i f i e d=FALSE,
p l o t=TRUE, auc . polygon=TRUE, max . auc . polygon=TRUE, g r id=TRUE,
p r in t . auc=TRUE, show . th r e s=TRUE)
sens . c i <− c i . se (pROC_obj)
p l o t ( sens . c i , type="shape " , c o l=" l i g h t b l u e " , main = ’LOG’ )
p l o t ( sens . c i , type="bars ")
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